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UNIVERSITY OF 
VOLUME 60 1992 No. 3 
"A LOST GENERATION": THE BA'ITLE FOR PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ADOPTION ASSISTANCE 
AND CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1980 
Barbara L. Atwell* 
[This] is a case about thousands of children who, due to family financial 
problems, psychological problems, and substance abuse problems, among 
other things, rely on the[government] to provide them with food, shelter, 
and day-to-day care. . . . It is about the failures of an ineptly managed 
child welfare system . . . and the resultant tragedies for . . . children 
relegated to entire childhoods spent in  foster care drip. Unfortunately, it 
is about a lost generation of children whose tragzc plight is being repeated 
aery day. 
Children are perhaps the most helpless segment of our society, 
and today they face numerous problems. For example, one out of 
five children lives in poverty;* many poor children, in particular, re- 
ceive substandard health care;g the teenage pregnancy statistics are 
B.A. Smith College, J.D. Columbia University I would like to thank the following 
individuals for their assistance: Professors Donald L. Doernberg, Michael B. Mushlin, 
and Merrill Sobie, Associate Dean Norman Lichtenstein, and my research assistants 
Shelley Howard Grant and Anita Matthews. 
1. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 960, 998 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that 
District of Columbia Department of Human Services had deprived foster care children 
of their constitutional and statutory rights). 
2. NATIONAL COMMISSION O  CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC, A NEW AMERICAN 
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 82 (1991). See aha id. at 80 ("Today, children are 
the poorest Americans."). 
3. Infant mortality rates in the United States, for example, are embarrassing given 
the current level of medical technology and the fact that the mortality rates could be 
substantially reduced if all women had access to prenatal care. NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON CHILDREN, supra note 2, at  119-22. "Each year, nearly 40,000 babies born in the 
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a~tounding;~ the quality of public education has been seriously 
questioned;5 and the list goes on.6 In addition, funding for chil- 
dren's programs is often the first item to be cut from federal, state, 
and local spending budgets.' The many thousands of children8 liv- 
ing in foster careg are especially vulnerable.1° They are often chil- 
dren of drug addicts, children who have been physically and 
mentally abused, or children who have been simply neglected. 
These children have been described as a "tragic class of people."ll 
United States die before their first birthdays. . . . This nation's infant mortality rate is 
higher than those of 21 other industrialized countries." Id. at 119. In addition, much 
recent attention has been focused on the failure to immunize children. See Robert Pear, 
Bush Defers an Emergacy Plan to Provide Vaccinesfor Children, N.Y. T I M E S , J U ~ ~  23, 1991, at 
Al .  "The failure to immunize youngsters is 'a warning flag' that signals the 
deterioration of basic health-care services for many children." Id. at A16. 
4. Each year, over a million girls under age 20 become pregnant. NATIONAL 
COMMISS~ON O N  CHILDREN, Supra note 2, at 223. 
5. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, s u p a  note 2, at 186 ("More than a 
dozen blue-ribbon commissions and task forces over the past decade have warned of the 
inadequacy of America's educational system and urged reform."); Susan Chira, For 
Freshman Teacher Corps, a Sobering Year, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at A1 (reviewing first 
year of "Teach for America" program, which "seeks to revive public education"). 
6. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 80. 
7. Funding for childhood immunization is but one recent example of this 
phenomenon. See Pear, supra note 3, at Al ,  A16 (discussing White House decision to 
defer implementation of emergency plan to buy and distribute vaccines that would cost 
$91 million, even though "[iln some inner-city neighborhoods, only about half the 
children have had the measles vaccine."). The cuts  in funding are arguably due to 
children's lack of political clout. 
8. In 1988, there were more than 340,000 children estimated to be living in foster 
care in the United States. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, 
1 0 1 s ~  CONC., IST SESS., NO PLACE TO CALL HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN I AMERICA 5 
(Comm. Print 1989) [hereinafter No PLACE TO CALL HOME]. Some predict that this 
number will jump to 550,000 by 1995. Id. at 19. 
9. Foster care means "24-hour care where the child has been transferred outside 
his parents' home and into the child welfare system as a result of either court order o r  
voluntary placement." Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
423, 423 n.3 (1983). 
10. Marcia Lowry, Dem'ng-Do in the 19803: Child Welfore Impact Litigation Afer the 
Wawen Years, 20 FAM. L.Q. 255, 257 (1986)("[Foster] children . . . are the most 
vulnerable in this country; almost all are poor and members of minority groups are 
disproportionately overrepresented."). 
11. Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980, 996 (7th Cir. 1990) (Manion, J., dissenting) 
("We are confronted with a tragic class of people' - children of alcohol and drug 
addicts, children victimized by severe domestic violence, children who are abused in 
unimaginable ways, children who are malnourished, sick and neglected."), cert. granted 
sub nom. Suter v. Artist M., 11 1 S. Ct. 2008 (1991). See also No PLACE TO CALL HOME, 
supra note 8, at 2: 
Mounting child poverty and rapid increases in child abuse reports are 
major contributors to the dramatic increase in placement of children 
outside their families. It is also impossible to ignore the devastating 
impact that drug and alcohol abuse are having on families, propelling 
children into out-of-home care at an escalating rate. 
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Moreover, all too often, the foster care systems designed to help 
these children further damages them.12 The plight of the many 
thousands of children living in foster care in the United States is 
well-documented.13 Foster children have historically found them- 
selves in an interminable state of foster care drift - being moved 
from location to location with little hope of permanent placement.14 
12. See, e.g., John J. Musewicz, The Failure of Foster Care: Federal Statutory Rejonn and the 
Child's Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 637-47 (1981); see alco Lowry, supra 
note 10, at 257: 
[Foster care] systems take these children of the poor and, in many 
instances, complete what poverty and discrimination have begun, 
destroying salvageable human beings and producing yet another 
generation of the economically dependent ' and socially and 
psychologically unfit. Grown up, these former foster children fill our 
mental hospitals, ourjails and our welfare rolls. One study found that 50 
percent of the homeless youth on our streets are young people who were 
raised in foster care. 
13. See, e.g., FOSTER CHILDREN I  THE COURTS (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (describing 
problems in current foster care system); Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In 
Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 CEO. LJ. 1745, 1749 (1987) (discussing minimum 
intervention theory); Lowry, supra note 10, at 257 (explaining that there are thousands 
of children in state-funded foster care systems that "inflict additional harm on already 
damaged children"); Musewicz, supra note 12, at 642 (explaining that too little is done to 
keep children out of foster care, or to reunite children with their parents); Michel B. 
Mushlin, Unsafe H a u m :  The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and 
Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 199, 201 (1988) (assessing constitutional rights of 
foster children); Laura Oren, Deshaney's Unjnished Business: The Foster Child's Due Process 
Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L. REV. 113, 120 (1990) (stating that voluntariness distinction is 
artificial and should not form basis of child's constitutional right to safety); Alice C. 
Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforfi in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. 
W .  L. REV. 223, 224 (1990) (summarizing statutory, regulatory, judicial, and 
programmatic steps taken to implement reasonable efforts in child welfare system); J.C. 
Barden, Foster Care System Reeling, Despite Law Meant to Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2 1, 1990, at 
Al ("[Floster  care^ has grown intb a multi-billion dbllar system of ;onfusion and 
misdirection."); Jerry Cheslow, Foster Care in State Is Facing a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
1989, at 12NJ, 1 (stating that New Jersey foster-care system was facing shortage of foster 
parents); Kenneth J. Garcia, Health Alannfor Foster Care, L.A. TIMES, NOV. 30, 1989, at 
A3. (stating that children in foster care are ten times more likely to suffer illness and 
inadequate care than other children). 
14. See, e.g. , .  Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 
U.S. 816, 835-36 (1977) ("[Clhildren often stay in 'temporary' foster care for much 
longer than contemplated. . . . The District Court found . . . that the median time spent 
in foster care in New York was over four years. Indeed, many children apparently remain 
in this 'limbo' indefinitely."); H.R. REP. NO. 136,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46.49-50 (1979); 
Lowry, supra note 10, at 259 (explaining that many children are moved from foster home 
to foster home); Musewicz, supra note 12, at 636 (1981) (stating that children in foster 
care "are often ignored by child welfare agencies, which are content to allow temporary 
removal from the parental home to evolve into a de facto long term placement, rather 
than providing the-initiative and services necessary either to return the child home or to 
free the child for permanent placement"). 
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The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 198015 (Child 
Welfare Act) constitutes a congressional effort to protect children in 
foster care and to help alleviate foster care drift by creating a com- 
prehensive structure for foster care.16 The Act has three major 
goals: first, to provide sufficient preplacement services to families to 
prevent the need for children to enter the foster care system; sec- 
ond, to protect and provide proper care to children while they re- 
main in foster care; and third, to move children through the foster 
care system and back home or into adoptive placements as quickly 
as possible.17 To achieve these goals, the Act provides federal 
financial assistance to states that structure and implement a foster 
care systems in accordance with the Act's requirements.18 Con- 
versely, the Act provides for the withdrawal or reduction of financial 
assistance from states that do not adhere to the federal 
requirements. lg  
Aside from the potential elimination or reduction of federal finan- 
cial assistance, the Act includes little in terms of remedies for a 
state's failure to c0mply.2~ It is silent as to whether children living 
15. Pub. L. No. 96-272.94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). The sections discussed will be $ 5  620-28, and 670-79. 
16. For a critical analysis of some of the shortcomings of the Act, see Musewicz, supra 
note 12 at 709-38; Shotton, supra note 13, at 227. 
17. See 42 U.S.C. 5 625(a)(1) (1988). See also S. REP. NO. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1461 ("[Ilt would be appropriate and 
desirable at this time to modify the law in a way which will deemphasize the use of foster 
care and encourage greater efforts to place children in permanent homes."). Once a 
child is in foster care there are generally five possible placement goals. LaShawn A. v. 
Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 973 (D.D.C. 1991). First, the goal may be to return the child 
to his or her biological parents. Id. Second, the child may be placed with a relative or 
other person. Id. Third, placing the child for adoption may be the placement goal. Id. 
Fourth, the long term plan may simply be long term foster care. Id. This goal is 
generally considered appropriate only when the child is at least 13 years old and other 
permanent options have been ruled out. Id. Finally, if the child is approaching the age 
of majority and other options have been ruled out, the child may be declared 
independent. Id. 
18. 42 U.S.C. $ 5  621, 623, 674 (1988). For a detailed analysis of the Act's funding 
provisions, see Mary Lee ~ l l e n ,  A Guide to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
1980 ,  in FOSTER CHILDREN I  THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 575; Musewicz, supra note 
12, at 710-17. 
19. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 671(b) (West Supp. 1991). 
20. Id. The Child Welfare Act provides that: 
[I]n any case in which the Secretary finds, after reasonable notice and 
opportunity for a hearing, that a State [Foster Care Pllan . . . no longer 
complies with the provisions of subsection (a) . . . or that in the 
administration of the plan there is a substantial failure to comply with the 
provisions of the plan, the Secretary shall notify the State that further 
payments will not be made to the State under this part, or that such 
payments will be made to the State but reduced by an amount which the 
Secretary determines appropriate, until the Secretary is satisfied that 
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in foster care can privately enforce the Act. Under 42 U.S.C. 
8 1983, however, a person who has been deprived of a federal statu- 
tory right can, under appropriate circumstances, sue state officials 
responsible for the deprivation of that right.21 In several cases, 
plaintiffs have used section 1983 in an effort to privately enforce the 
Child Welfare Although many courts have permitted section 
1983 claims .based on the Act's provisions, some courts have not.25 
Moreover, most courts that recognize a section 1983 claim suggest 
that its scope is quite limited;24 they agree that an enforceable right 
is created in only one isolated section of the Child Welfare Act. 
With respect to the Act's many other provisions, no consensus ex- 
ists. In addition, when courts find enforceable rights, they often tai- 
lor injunctive relief very narrowly and deny plaintiffs damages.25 
This article suggests that the scope of enforceable section 1983 
rights is broader than most courts have recognized. The Act creates 
comprehensive rights to 1) preplacement preventive services,26 2) 
there is no longer any such failure to comply, and until he is so satisfied 
he shall make no further payments to the State, or shall reduce such 
payments by the amount specified in his notification to the State. 
Id. For further discussion of this provision, see infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
21. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1988). The use of 5 1983 to enforce The Child Welfare Act is 
discussed in section 11, infra. 
22. See infra notes 167-94 and accompanying text. The claims asserted under the 
Child Welfare Act are generally accompanied by constitutional substantive due process 
claims. see, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Sews., 109 S. Ct. 998, 
1006-07 (1989) ("[Tlhe State had no constitutional duty to protect . . . [a child] against 
his father's violence. Even its failure to do so . . . simply does not constitute a violation 
of the Due Process Clause."); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846,849 (7th Cir. 
1990) ("[Tlhe state removed a child from the custody of her parents; and having done 
so, it could no more place her in a position of danger deliberately and without 
justification, without thereby violating her rights under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than it could deliberatelv and without iustification   lace a 
.a 
criminal defendant in a jail or prison in which his health or safety would be endangered, 
without violating his rights either under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
Eight Amendment . . . or the due process clause."); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 
794-98 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) ("We hold that a child 
involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a situation so analogous to a prisoner in a 
penal institution and a child confined in a mental health facility that the foster child may 
bring a section 1983 action for violation of fourteenth amendment rights."); Doe v. New 
York City Dep't of Soc. Sews., 649 F.2d 134, 141-47 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that child 
in foster care had constitutional right to be safeguarded from abuse), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 864 (1983); see also Mushlin, supra note 13, at 217-33 (discussing constitutional right 
to safety); Oren, supra note 13, at 155 (stating that foster care is form of state custody to 
which due process clause applies and state's failure to protect children in its custody is 
violation of 5 1983). This article is limited to a discussion of 5 1983 claims based on the 
Child Welfare Act. 
23. See infra notes 167-295 and accompanying text. 
24. See i~lfia notes 273-95 and accompanying text. 
25. See i~lfm notes 273-95 and accompanying text. 
26. See irlfia notes 52-62 and accompanying text. 
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proper care while children are in state custody,27 and 3) permanency 
planning services.28 Courts must be more willing to recognize these 
rights and to take a more creative role in,structuring injunctive relief 
when these rights have been violated. Part I is an overview of the 
Act. Part I1 analyzes the appropriateness of section 1983 claims 
under the Act. Finally, Part 111 analyzes the proper scope of section 
1983 claims. The article concludes that private enforcement of the 
Act is essential if the goals of the Act are to be achieved. As the 
introductory quote  illustrate^,^^ the passage of the Act has not, in 
itself, brought about the necessary changes in foster care.s0 A pri- 
vate right of action for the children and families that the Act is 
designed to protect has helped, and can further help, to achieve 
those goals.31 
Prior to the enactment of the Child Welfare Act, Title IV-A of the 
Social Security provided federal financial assistance for chil- 
dren in foster care who would qualify for Aid to Families with De- 
pendent Children (AFDC) but for their removal from their homes.ss 
This AFDC foster care program was of limited benefit, however, be- 
cause financial assistance was given to states only for foster care, to 
the total exclusion of adoption.s4 Because of this financial disincen- 
27. See infra notes 63-85 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text. 
29. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
30. Although the number of foster children dropped during the first five years after 
Congress enacted the Child Welfare Act, from approximately 300,000 to 275,000, the 
number has grown steadily since 1985. No PLACE TO CALL HOME, supra note 8, at 19; 
Barden, supra note 13, at Al .  The increase in drug and alcohol abuse appears to be one 
of the primary reasons for the increase. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, supra note 
2, at 289. 
31. See in/ra notes 273-336 and accompanying text. 
32. 42 U.S.C.A. $ 5  601-17 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). Title IV-A sets forth 
requirements for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 
33. S. REP. NO. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1459. 
34. See id at 10-1 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 1450, 1460-61; Bussiere, Federal 
Adoption Assistance for Children with Special Nee&, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 587, 587 (1985). 
Federal reimbursement was available under Titles IV-A and IV-B of the 
Social Security Act for foster care payments and services, but no federal 
participation was available for state adoption assistance programs. 
Therefore, the state and local share of cost was greater for children in 
subsidized adoptive homes than for children in federally reimbursed 
foster care. [The Act] removes this disincentive by providing federal 
reimbursement for payments made on behalf of eligible children. 
Id. 
In addition, federal financial assistance was only available for court-ordered place- 
ments to the exclusion of voluntary placements. Id. at 1459. Since voluntary place- 
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tive for states to take children out of foster care and place them for 
adoption, children often lingered in foster care for unduly long peri- 
ods of time.35 
The federal funding scheme was also limited because it provided 
AFDC foster care reimbursement only for out of home care. No 
federal funding was provided for preventive services designed to 
keep families together.36 Thus, until the child was removed from 
his or her home, no federal financial assistance was available. While 
these limitations in the federal foster care law did not account for 
the complex host of problems that caused foster care to malfunction 
in this country, they did contribute to the problem.37 
ments constitute "as much as half" of the total foster care population, this was a major 
limitation. Garrison, supra note 13, at 1748. 
35. A 1977 study, The National Study of Social Seruices to Children and Their Families, 
concluded that the median length of stay in foster care was two and one-half years. See 
S. REP. NO. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980). reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 
1460. A later study concluded that 14% of foster children remain in foster care five 
years or more. T o s ~ l o  TATARA, AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOCIATION, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN IN SUBSTITUTE AND ADOPTIVE CARE: A STATISTICAL 
SUMMARY OF THE VCIS NATIONAL CHILD WELFARE DATA BASE 46 (1990). Senator 
Cranston, who introduced the Senate version of the bill, remarked: 
One of the prime weaknesses of our existing foster care system is that, 
once a child enters the system and remains in it for even a few months, 
the child is likely to become 'lost' in the system. . . . Foster care, with a 
few exceptions, should be a temporary placement; unfortunately, under 
our existing system, temporary foster care becomes a permanent solution 
for far too many children. 
125 CONG. REC. S22,684 (1979). 
36. Although Title IV-B of the Social Security Act theoretically provided federal 
financial assistance for a range of services, including preventive services, in practice the 
limited funds available under Title IV-B - prior to 1980, Congress never appropriated 
more than $56.5 million to Title IV-B, although $266 million was authorized - were 
used by the states primarily for foster children not eligible under the AFDC foster care 
program. Allen, supra note 18, at 577. In order to encourage states to use Title IV-B 
funds for preventive and reunification services, the Act disallows the use of any increase 
in appropriations over $56.5 million for foster care maintenance payments. 42 U.S.C. 
j 623(c)(1) (1988). 
37. In addition to any legislative shortcomings, the sheer increase in the number of 
foster children, due in large part to increased drug and alcohol abuse, and poverty, has 
strained states' resources. See Barden, supra note 13, at A18. 
[I]n New York City last year, 3,000 infants entered foster care from 
hospitals, testifying to the devastating effects of their mothers' drug 
use. . . . [Moreover,] the presiding judge of the Juvenile Courts in Los 
Angeles said that about 90 percent of the 20,000 children who would 
come before his courts this year would be there because of parental drug 
or alcohol abuse. [Even without these substance abuse problems], some 
children 'would still enter [foster] care due to a lack of affordable housing 
for low-income families.' 
Id.; see also NATIONAL COMMISSION  CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 284 ("[A] recent analy- 
sis of the factors that place children at risk of maltreatment suggests that only family 
income is consistently related to all categories of abuse and neglect."). 
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After identifying the foster care problems, Congress created Ti- 
tles IV-B and IV-E of the Child Welfare Title IV-E provides 
for partial reimbursement by the federal government of "foster care 
maintenance payments"39 made by the states4() It also provides 
federal financial assistance for qualified adoption  program^.^' Title 
IV-B applies to the provision of child welfare services in general.42 
Together, Titles IV-B and IV-E require that states create three sepa- 
rate plans in order to receive federal financial assistance. First, Title 
IV-B requires a general plan for the provision of child welfare serv- 
ices (Child Welfare Plan).43 In addition, Title IV-E requires that 
38. 42 U.S.C.A. $$620-29, 670-79 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). 
39. "Foster care maintenance payments" are defined as: 
Payments to cover the cost of (and the cost of providing) food, clothing, 
shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a child's personal incidentals, 
liability insurance with respect to a child, and reasonable travel to the 
child's home for visitation. In the case of institutional care, such term 
shall include the reasonable costs of administration and operation of such 
institution as are necessarily required to provide the items described in 
the preceding sentence. 
5 675(4)(A). 
40. $ 674. Title IV-E, like the former Title IV-A applies to children who would be 
eligible for AFDC. $ 674(b)(5)(D). Although state participation in the general AFDC 
program is voluntary, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970); McCoog v. 
Hegstrom, 690 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982), participation must include the foster 
care component, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 900.96th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1980), repn'nted 
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1561, 1564. 
The Act covers both the voluntary placement of children in foster care and placement 
as the result of judicial determinations, $ 672(a)(1)-(3). although there are certain 
funding restrictions for children who have been placed voluntarily, see $ 672(d)-(g); 45 
C.F.R. $ 1356.30 (1990), such as a judicial determination within 180 days of placement 
that the placement is in the best interests of the child, 5 672(e); 45 C.F.R. $ 1356.30(b). 
Moreover, states must fulfill all the requirements of $ 627(b) for voluntarily placed 
children in order to receive federal funds. $ 672(d). 
The Act covers both foster family homes and other child care institutions, public and 
private, that have been approved by the state. $ 672(a)(3), (b)-(c). An approved "child- 
care institution" may not have more than 25 children and must not be an institution 
"operated primarily for the detention of children who are determined to be 
delinquent." $ 672(c). 
41. $ 673. The federal reimbursement for adoption applies to children with special 
needs, such as handicapped children, older children, and members of certain racial 
groups. Id. This article addresses issues related to children while in foster care and 
does not address that portion of the Act related to adoption assistance. 
42. $ 625(a)(l). States comply with Title IV-B on a voluntary basis. S. REP. NO. 336, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1461. Unlike Title 
IV-E, which applies to children who would be eligible for AFDC but for their placement 
in foster care, see supra note 40 and accompanying text, Title IV-B applies to all children 
in state supervised care, see $ 625(a)(l). 
43. $ 622(a). It provides that, "In order to be eligible for payment under this part, a 
State must have a plan for child welfare services which . . . meets the requirements of 
$ 622 subsection (b)." Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. $5 1355.21, 1356.20(a) (1990) (setting 
requirements for contents, submission, and inspection of State plans). 
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states adopt a plan for the overall operation of their foster care sys- 
tems (Foster Care Plan).44 Moreover, individualized case plans for 
each child in foster care (Case Plan) are required.45 Also, under.Ti- 
tle IV-E, the states must create a case review system to periodically 
review the status of each child in foster care (Case Review S y ~ t e m ) . ~ ~  
The three plans and the Case Review System are designed to ad- 
dress the needs of children and their families from the time the chil- 
dren are reported to be at risk of removal from their homes until 
they are permanently placed back home or with an adoptive family. 
The requirements for the Child Welfare Plan are largely administrative. 5 622. The 
Child Welfare Plan must provide for a single organizational unit to furnish child welfare 
services, 5 622(b)(l)(B), and must coordinate the provision of child welfare services with 
other social services, 5 622(b)(2). It must also provide for the "training and effective use 
of paid paraprofessional staff," 5 622(b)(4), and "emphasi[ze]. . . the full-time or part- 
time employment of persons of low income, as community service aides, in the 
administration of the plan, and . . . the use of nonpaid or partially paid volunteers in 
providing services and in assisting any advisory committees established by the State 
agency." Id. The Child Welfare Plan must also provide for the "utilization of . . . 
facilities and experience of voluntary agencies" to render services, contain a description 
of available services, and specify the geographic areas where such services will be 
available." 8 622(b)(5),(7); see 45 C.F.R. $5 1357.15(b)-(c) (1990). The Child Welfare 
Plan must also provide for meeting reporting requirements established by the Act. 
5 622(b)(8); see also 8 676(b) (describing specific plan requirements). 
44. 8 67 1 (a) ("In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall 
have a [Foster Care Pllan approved by the Secretary."); 45 C.F.R. $9 1356.20(a), 
1356.21(a) (1990). Like the Child Welfare Plan, the Foster Care Plan must include a 
variety of administrative provisions, 5 671(a), such as a procedure for maintaining the 
confidentiality, to the extent possible, of the individuals assisted by the plan, 5 671(a)(8), 
and a procedure for making foster care maintenance payments, 5 671(a)(l). In addition, 
the Foster Care Plan must provide an opportunity for a fair hearing to any individual 
who has been denied benefits or whose claim has not been acted upon in a timely 
manner. 3 67 1 (a)(12). 
45. 8 671(a)(16). The Foster Care Plan requires the creation of the Case Plan. Id. 
The Case Plan is geared specifically toward the individual child rather than to the foster 
care system as a whole, 8 675(1), and must be created within 60 days of the child's 
placement in the state foster care system. 45 C.F.R. 8 1356.21(d)(2) (1990). "In 
requiring .the development of written case plans for individual children in care, 
Congress recognized that too frequently there is little documentation of an agency's 
plans for a particular child and no specific goals or timetables against which a child's 
progress can be measured." Allen, supra note 18, at 582. Prior to 1980, Title IV-A 
included very generalized provisions for case plans and periodic reviews. The Child 
Welfare Act sets forth in greater detail, what the substance of the plans and the periodic 
reviews should entail. 126 CONG. REC. 514,767 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston); 
125 CONG. REC. 529,939 (1979) (statement of Sen. Cranston) ("The legislation . . . 
would strengthen the provisions in existing law by describing exactly what factors 
should be covered in the case plan."). 
Each of the three plans required by Titles IV-B and IV-E must be in writing and must 
be approved by the Department of Health and Human Services, the federal agency 
charged with overseeing compliance with the Act. 45 C.F.R. $5 1356.20(c), 
1356.21(d)(l), 1357.15. 
46. 55 671(a)(16), 675(5)(B); for further discussion of the Case Review system, see 
infra notes 67-71, 95-103 and accompanying text. 
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In order to sufficiently serve fa'milies from the time the state agency 
becomes aware of a problem until there is a permanent resolution, 
the Act requires that states address three key areas:47 first, states 
must provide preplacement services to help reduce the 
need for foster ~ a r e ; ~ 8  second, states must insure proper care for 
children in foster ~ a r e ; ~ g  and third, states must provide permanency 
planning services.50 
A. Preventive Services 
One of the primary purposes of the Act is to prevent the need for 
a child's removal from his or her home.51 In order to achieve this 
goal, states are only entitled to reimbursement52 for foster care 
maintenance payments under Title IV-E as long as certain require- 
ments are met.53 First, the Foster Care Plan requires that states 
make "reasonable efforts . . . prior to placement of a child in foster 
care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from 
his home."54 As previously discussed, states were only entitled to 
federal financial assistance for out-of-home care before the passage 
of the Child Welfare Act. Congress recognized that the funding 
scheme encouraged rather than discouraged the breakup of fami- 
lies.55 Congress, therefore, made prevention of a child's removal a 
key purpose of the Act in order to reduce the number of children 
entering foster care by requiring that reasonable efforts be made to 
help families in need prior to the child's removal.56 As Senator 
Cranston explained: 
47. 5 625(a)(1). 
48. 5 671(a)(15). 
49. 5 671(a)(10). 
50. 5 625(a)(l)(D)-(E). 
51. 5 625(a)(l). 
52. For a detailed account of the federal-state reimbursement provisions, see Allen, 
supra note 18, at 578-81; Musewicz, supra note 12, at 71 1-15. 
53. 5 671(a). 
54. 5 671(a)(15). This provision took effect on October 1, 1983. Id. Consistent with 
the reasonable efforts required by the Foster Care Plan, the Case Plan must also include 
a description of preventive services that were offered to the child and his or her family. 
45 C.F.R. 5 1356.21(d)(4) (1990). The Child Welfare Plan required by Title IV-B must 
contain a description of the steps states will take to provide child welfare services, 
including "(A) covering additional political subdivisions, (B) reaching additional 
children in need of services, and (C) expanding and strengthening the range of existing 
services and developing new types of services." 5 622(b)(6). The definition of child 
welfare services includes preventive services. 5 625 (a)(l)(B) (quoted infra note 59 and 
accompanying text). 
55. 126 CONG. REC. 14,767 (1980). 
56. Id. 
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[Sltates must make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal 
of children from their homes. In the past, foster care has often 
been the first option selected when a family is in trouble: the 
new provisions will require States to examine alternatives and 
provide, wherever feasible, home-based services that will help 
keep families together, or help reunite families. . . . Far too 
many children and families have been broken apart when they 
could have been preserved with a little effort. Foster care 
ought to be a last resort rather than the first.57 
Although the Child Welfare Act requires that the states make rea- 
sonable efforts to help families before removing a child, the Act 
does not define reasonable efforts. The regulations, however, sug- 
gest that reasonable efforts may include some of the same services 
as those defined in Title IV-B as "child welfare services":58 services 
aimed at "preventing the unnecessary separation of children from 
their families by identifying family problems, assisting families in 
resolving their problems, and preventing breakup of the family 
where the prevention af child removal is desirable and possible."59 
In addition, the regulations promulgated under the Act set forth 
some specific examples of child welfare services that may also satisfy 
the reasonable efforts requirement. Such services include: 
57. Id. It is somewhat ironic, with its emphasis on reasonable efforts to eliminate the 
need for foster care, that Title IV-E's funding scheme does not go as far as it could to 
encourage in home services over out-of-home care. Title IV-E reimburses states for 
foster care maintenance payments made on behalf of eligible children, thereby 
subsidizing a percentage of the states' costs. 1 674. Although eligible children include 
only those placed in foster care as a result of a judicial determination that the reasonable 
efforts requirement has been met and that continuation in the home would be contrary 
to the child's welfare, 672(a)(1), (or those voluntarily placed in care), id., foster care 
maintenance payments kick in only after the child has been placed in foster care, $9 674, 
675(4). In other words, Title IV-E reimburses states for payments covering out-of-home 
care. Id. Accordingly, while Title IV-E requires that states make reasonable efforts to 
eliminate the need for foster care, it does not directly finance such efforts. On the other 
hand, 671(a), provides that "[iln order for a State to be eligible for payments under 
this part," the Foster Care Plan must provide that "in each case, reasonable efforts will 
be made." 8 671(a)(15). Without such reasonable efforts, the states arguably are not 
entitled to any Title IV-E funding. 
58. 45 C.F.R. 1356.21(b). 
59. 8 625 (a)(l)(C). The Child Welfare Act further defines "child welfare services" 
as: 
public social services which are directed toward the accomplishment of 
the following purposes: (A) protecting and promoting the welfare of all 
children, including handicapped, homeless, dependent, or neglected 
children; (B) preventing or remedying, or assisting in the solution of 
problems which may result in, the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or 
delinquency of children." 
§ 625(a)(1). 
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procedures and arrangements for access to available emer- 
gency financial assistance; arrangements for the provision of 
temporary child care to provide respite to the family for a brief 
period, as part of a plan for preventing children's removal 
from home; . . . home-based family services, self-help groups, 
services to unmarried parents, provision of or arrangements 
for mental health, drug and alcohol abuse counseling, voca- 
tional counseling or vocational rehabi l i ta t i~n.~~ 
The requirement to use reasonable efforts to prevent the need for 
foster care is one of the most important requirements of the Act for 
reducing the number of children who enter the foster care system. 
Reasonable efforts, however, will not always be successful. Situa- 
tions may exist, such as those that place a child in imminent physical 
danger, which require the removal of the child from the home.61 
Studies have shown, though, that where preventive services are 
available, many children can be spared the trauma of being removed 
from their homes.62 Both the reasonable efforts required by the 
Foster Care Plan and the provision of child welfare and other serv- 
ices pursuant to the Title IV-B dictate that the state provide suffi- 
cient preventive services to reduce the need for foster care. 
B. Proper Care 
In addition to providing for preventive services, a second purpose 
of the Act is to ensure that children in foster care are safe.63 
Although it is primarily the Case Plan that addresses this goal on an 
individualized basis, the Foster Care Plan and the Case Review Sys- 
tem also establish a number of general requirements to ensure 
proper care. For example, the Foster Care Plan requires that states 
establish and maintain foster care standards that "are reasonably in 
accord with recommended standards of national organi~at ions ."~~ 
In addition, every foster family home or other child-care institution, 
must meet state licensing requirements.65 If the state has reason to 
60. 45  C.F.R. 5 1357.15(e)(2). 
61. H.R. REP. NO. 136, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1979) ("[Tlhe Committee 
recognizes that the preventive service requirement would be inappropriate in certain 
. . . circumstances."); 126 CONG. REC. 14,767 (1980) (statement of  Sen. Cranston) ("Of 
course, state child protective agencies will continue to have authority to remove 
immediately children from dangerous situations."); Allen, supra note 18, at 589-90. 
62. Celia W. Dugger, New York City Eels Millions on hesewing Families, N.Y. TIMES, 
July. 19, 1991, at dl. Not all the experts agree that preventive services have been 
effective. Id. at B4. 
63. Q 671(a)(10). 
64. Id. The standards must be reviewed periodically. Q 671(a)(l I); 45  C.F.R. 
Q 1356.2 1 (g). 
65. Q 672(c). 
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believe that the foster care setting is "unsuitable for the child be- 
cause o f .  . . neglect, abuse, or exploitation," it must take affirmative 
steps to inform the proper authorities.66 The Case Review System 
must also establish a procedure to determine the appropriateness of 
the p l a ~ e m e n t . ~ ~  It requires states to review the educational and 
health records of the child and to update them as needed.68 In addi- 
tion, any available health and educational information should be 
made available to the foster parents or foster care providers to help 
them better care for the children.6g 
Although the Foster Care Plan and the Case Review System estab- 
lish requirements for proper care of the children, the Case Plan is 
the primary method to ensure that each child receive proper care 
while in state custody.70 Although the Act does not expressly define 
everything that is encompassed by the term "proper care," it re- 
quires that the Case Plan include "[a] description of the type of 
home or institution in which a child is to be placed, including a dis- 
cussion of the appropriateness of the p l a~emen t . "~~  The Act sug- 
gests that proper care begins with "placement in the least restrictive 
(most family like) setting available and in close proximity to the par- 
ents' home, consistent with the best interests and special needs of 
the child."72 Proper care also requires providing for the physical 
safety of the child,73 including such basic items as adequate food, 
clothing and ~helter .7~ In addition, proper care requires review of 
the child's health and education records.75 To that end, the Case 
Plan must include health and educational information, such as the 
child's grade in school, his school record, and a record of any known 
medical problems.76 Furthermore, the Case Plan must include "as- 
surances that the child's placement . . . takes into account proximity 
to the school in which the child is enrolled at the time of place- 
66. $ 671(a)(9). 
67. 5 675(5)(B). 
68. $ 675(5)(D). 
69. Id. 
70. $ 675(1)(B) (defining Case Plan, in part, as, "a plan for assuring that the child 
receives proper care."). Similarly, child welfare services are defined to include services 
to assure "adequate care of children away from their homes." $ 625(a)(l)(F). 
71. $ 675(1). 
72. $ 675(5)(A). The Case Plan should include a discussion of how the plan was 
designed to achieve this goal. $ 675(1); 45 C.F.R. $ 1356.21 (d)(3). 
73. 3 671 (a)(10). The national standards that states must maintain include standards 
related to "safety." Id. 
74. $ 675(4)(A). 
75. $ 675 (5)(D). 
76. $ 675(1)(C). 
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ment."77 In order to monitor the child, proper care should include 
the prompt assignment to each child of a caseworker and regular 
visits by the caseworker to the child's pla~ement . '~  Most impor- 
tantly, perhaps, proper care requires that states provide sufficient 
services to the children and foster care parents to ensure the child's 
well-being while he or she is in custody.79 
Although Title IV-B applies to the provision of child welfare serv- 
ices in genera1,eO it also provides that in addition to the federal fi- 
nancial assistance a state receives for the provision of child welfare 
services, a state may be entitled to additional payments (Additional 
Payments P r ~ g r a m ) ~ '  specifically for foster care services if it, among 
other things, implements "a statewide information system" capable 
of tracking each child who has been in the foster care system within 
the past twelve months.82 Without an information system, children 
77. Id. Proper care should also include protection of the child's emotional well- 
being and protection of the child's "civil rights." § 671(a)(10). 
78. For a discussion of some of the problems commonly associated with the 
caseworker requirement, see in fa  notes 273183 and accompanying text. 
79. 8 675(1)(B). The Case Plan is defined, in part, as "a plan for assuring . . . that 
services are provided to address the needs of the child while in foster care, including a 
discussion of the appropriateness of the services that have been provided to the child 
under the plan." Id. 
80. See $9 620-29. Such services are defined in part as services for "assuring 
adequate care of children away from their homes, in cases where the child cannot be 
returned home or cannot be placed for adoption." 8 625(a)(l)(F). 
81. 8 627(a). Whether the state is entitled to additional funds depends, in part, on 
the amount of funds appropriated under § 620. Id. Only if Congress appropriates more 
than $141 million can a state receive additional funds. Id. Prior to the Act, the 
appropriation never exceeded $56.5 million even though Title IV-B authorized 
appropriations of up to $266 million. S. REP. NO. 336,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1460. Between 1977 and 1989, Congress kept the 
Title IV-B authorization level at $266 million. In 1989 Congress increased the 
authorization to $325 million for fiscal year 1991. NATIONAL COMMISSION O  CHILDREN, 
supra note 2, at 290. 
If a state fails to implement the requirements of the Additional Payments Program, by 
the time the federal funds appropriated for two consecutive fiscal years is equal to $266 
million, its allotment of federal funds will be reduced to an amount equal to the state's 
1979 allotment. 1 627(b)(2); 45 C.F.R. 8 1357.25(c) (1990). Should the appropriation 
reach this level, Title IV-B would also require that the state implement "a preplacement 
preventive service program designed to help children remain with their families." 
9 627(b)(3). 
82. 627(a)(2)(A); see also 45 C.F.R. 5 1357.25(b) (1990) (requiring that tracking 
system includes children under care of State title IV-B or IV-E state agencies). The 
information system must . include, at a minimum, "the status, demographic 
characteristics, location and goals for placement." 627(a)(2)(A). The statewide 
information system, like the other requirements of the Additional Payments Program, 
encompasses both the proper care and permanency planning goals. See infra notes 84- 
85, 104-05 and accompanying text. For example, while the information system will help 
states provide proper care, requiring that the information system list placement goals 
Heinonline - -  60 U. Cin. L .  Rev. 606 1991-1992 
19921 ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE ACT 607 
can and do literally get lost in the system.8s Thus, it ,is essential that 
a state have immediate access to critical information concerning 
each child, including where they have been placed, what school they 
are attending, what special health care needs they may have, and 
what their placement goals are. In order to qualify for the Addi- 
tional Payments Program under Title IV-B, states must also conduct 
an inventory of all children who have been in the state foster care 
system for the past six months to determine the appropriateness of 
their current placement,84 to review their placement goals, and to 
determine what services are needed to' achieve those goals.85 
C. Permanency Planning 
In addition to ensuring the safety of children while they are in 
foster care, the Act requires that all of the required plans and the 
Czse Review System include a permanency planning component.a6 
The provision of child welfare services under the Child Welfare 
plan,-for example, includes services for "restoring to their families 
children who have been removed, by the provision of services to the 
child and the families [,I . . . [and] placing children in suitable adop- 
tive homes, in cases where restoration to the biological family is not 
possible or appr~priate."~' Similarly, the Case Plan is defined, in 
part, as a plan to "facilitate return of the child to his own home or 
the permanent placement of the and must provide for the 
will also help with permanency planning. The Additional Payments Program also 
includes a preventive service requirement. See supra note 81. 
83. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959,976 (D.D.C. 1991); Lynch v. King, 550 
F. Supp. 325, 345 (D. Mass. 1982), aff 'dsub nom. Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 
1983). As the court in LaShawn noted: 
The current information system . . . is unable to accurately identify the 
physical location of all of the children in foster care. . . . [Slocial workers 
track information on thousands of three-by-five inch index cards. . . . The 
Court can only wonder how an agency that cannot track the location of 
the children in its custody can possibly comply with the remaining 
requirements of federal . . . law, much less with reasonable professional 
standards. 
762 F. Supp. at 976-77. 
84. 8 627(a)(1); 45 C.F.R. 8 1357.25(b) (1990). In order to take advantage of the 
Additional Payments Program, states must also implement a case review system "for 
each child receiving foster care under the supervision of the State," 8 627(b)(2)(B), 
regardless of whether the child is eligible under Title IV-E for federal reimbursement. 
85. 5 627(a)(l). The inventory system should help determine "whether the child can 
be or should be returned to his parents or should be freed for adoption, and the services 
necessary to facilitate either the return of the child or the placement of the child for 
adoption or legal guardianship." Id. 
86. 8 627(a)(2)(C). 
87. 8 625(a)(l)(D)-(E). 
88. 8 675(1)(B). 
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rendering of necessary services to the child, foster parents, and bio- 
logical parents in order to achieve this goal.89 The Case Plan must 
also "include a description of the services offered and the services 
provided to prevent removal of the child from the home and to re- 
unify the family."gO 
In addition, the Foster Care Plan specifically requires that the 
foregoing services constitute "reasonable efforts" to return children 
to their homes.g1 As noted above, the Act does not define reason- 
able efforts, and what constitutes reasonable efforts will vary from 
case to case. Reasonable efforts to return the child home hill, in 
some cases, require the provision of the same services described 
above to help prevent the need for placement.92 For example, if the 
biological parents need drug counseling, the state's provision of 
such counseling may prevent the need for the child's removal from 
the home. On the other hand, a severe drug abuse problem may 
require the child's removal with ongoing drug counseling for the 
parents in an attempt to allow for the child's return home. The leg- 
islative history suggests that reunification services include "trans- 
portation services, family and individual therapy, psychiatric 
counseling, homemaker and housekeeper services, day care, con- 
sumer education, respite care, information and referral services and 
various transition and follow-up services."g3 Reasonable efforts to 
return the child home will include a variety of other services, such as 
89. Id. A Case Plan is defined, in part, as "a plan for assuring that services are 
provided to the parents, child, and foster parents in order to improve the conditions in 
the parents' home, facilitate return of the child to his own home or the permanent 
placement of the child." Id. When it appears that the family situation will not allow the 
child to return home, the state should attempt to terminate parental rights in order to 
enable the child to be placed for adoption. Parental rights can be terminated voluntarily 
or involuntarily. See Garrison, supra note 13, at 424-25. All too often, such efforts are 
never made. See infra note 305. 
90. 45 C.F.R. 3 1356.21(d)(4). 
91. 3 671(a)(15) ("In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it 
shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which . . . provides that, in each case, 
reasonable efforts will be made . . . to make it possible for the child to return to his 
home."). 
The language used in this provision does not include reasonable efforts to place the 
child for adoption if the return home is not feasible. The substantial equivalent of such 
a requirement, however, is found in other provisions of the Act. See, e.g.,  $ 6  625(a)(1), 
675(1)(B). 
The Foster Care Plan must also set "specific goals . . . as to the maximum number of 
children . . . who . . . will remain in foster care after having been in such care for a period 
in excess of twenty-four months" to help achieve the goal of minimizing the length of 
time spent in foster care. 3 671(a)(14). In addition, the state must set forth the steps it 
will take to achieve these goals. Id. Finally, the goals must be "incorporated into State 
law by statute or administrative regulation." 45 C.F.R. 3 1356.21(h). 
92. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
93. H.R. REP. NO. 136, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1979). 
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adequate visitation between the child and his or her parents while 
the child is in foster care.g4 
To achieve its ultimate goal of returning the child to his or her 
biological parents or of placing the child for adoption, the Case Re- 
view System provides for a two-tiered review. First, there is a re- 
view, Conducied by either a court or an administrative agency,g5 
which is to take place at least once every six months.96 This review 
must evaluate the need for and appropriateness of the child's cur- 
rent pla~ement,~'  and assess the progress being made toward re- 
turning the child home or releasing the child for adoption.98 The 
six month review must also "project a likely date by which the child 
may be returned to the home or placed for adoption or legal guardi- 
an~hip."~g Second, the Case Review System must establish a proce- 
dure for a formal dispositional court or administrative hearing to 
determine the future status of the child.lOO This dispositional hear- 
ing must take place within eighteen months of the original place- 
ment.lO1 Unlike the six-month review, the dispositional hearing 
must be held by a court or court-approved body.lo2 The Case Re- 
94. Foster care maintenance payments expressly include payments for "reasonable 
travel to the child's home for visitation." Congress also intended that the Case Review 
System would include procedural safeguards concerning, among other things, visitation 
rights. S. REP. NO. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1450, 1453. 
95. 5 675(5)(B). An administrative review is "a review open to the participation of 
the parents of the child, conducted by a panel of appropriate persons at least one of 
whom is not responsible for the case management of, or the delivery of services to, 
either the child or the parents who are the subject of the review." 5 675(6). 
96. 8 675(5)(B). 
97. 5 675(5)(A)-(B). 
98. 5 675(5)(B). 
99. Id. 
100. 5 675(5)(C); see 45 C.F.R. 5 1356.21(e). An exception to the requirement for 
dispositional hearings is allowed when the child is already free for adoption, has been 
placed in the adoptive home and is simply awaiting finalization of the adoption. 45 
C.F.R. 5 1356.21(e). The future status of the child includes, but is not limited to, 
whether the child should be returned to the parent, should be continued 
in foster care for a specified period, should be placed for adoption, or 
should (because of the child's special needs or circumstances) be 
continued in foster care on a permanent or long-term basis and, in the 
case of a child who has attained age 16, the services needed to assist the 
child to make the transition from foster care to independent living. 
5 675(5)(C). 
101. 5 675(5)(C). A dispositional hearing must take place periodically thereafter 
during the continuation of foster care. Id. "Original foster care placement means the 
date of the child's most recent removal from his home and placement into foster care 
under the care and responsibility of the State agency." 45 C.F.R. 5 1356.21(f). 
102. 5 675(5)(C): 
[Wlith respect to each . . . child, procedural safeguards will be applied, 
among other things, to assure each child in foster care under the 
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view System continues for as long as the child remains in foster 
care. lo3 
Finally, the Additional Payments Program requires that states im- 
plement a "service program" designed to place the child back in a 
permanent family setting.lo4 Because the provision of adequate 
services is the cornerstone of a good foster care system, the creation 
of a service program that will force the states to analyze the kinds of 
services they need to meet the goals of the Act is critical.lo5 
In sum, the' Child Welfare Act is a comprehensive Congressional 
effort to improve foster care conditions in the United States. Com- 
plying states are those that adopt and implement a Child Welfare 
Plan, a Foster Care Plan, a Case Plan and a Case Review System as 
described above.lo6 Each plan and the Case Review System have 
requirements that overlap the Act's goals of preventing the need for 
foster care, providing proper care to children in foster care and per- 
manency planning.lo7 It is the provision of sufficient services to 
children and their families that will help to achieve these goals. The 
biological parents need services designed to help them overcome 
the problems which initially led to the removal of the child.lO8 Com- 
mon problems include drug abuse, mental health problems, and fi- 
nancial instability.'Og Accordingly, the biological parents may need 
financial assistance, drug counseling, mental health care, or other 
services to prevent the need for foster care, or to help them regain 
supervision of the State of a dispositional hearing to be held, in a family 
o r  juvenile court or another court . . . of competent jurisdiction, or by an 
administrative body appointed o r  approved by the court. 
See also Allen, supra note 18, at 583 ("A review by a body external to the agency increases 
the likelihood of careful case planning and requires the agency to account for the child's 
well-being."). For a detailed comparison of the 6 and 18 month reviews, see Musewicz, 
supra note 12, at 732-33. 
103. 5 675(5). The Case Review System also requires "procedural safeguards . . . 
with respect to parental rights pertaining to the removal o f  the child from the home of 
his parents, to a change in the child's placement, and to any determination affecting 
visitation privileges of parents." 5 675(5)(C). 
104. 5 627(a)(2)(C). A state shall not be entitled to additional payments unless it "has 
implemented and is operating to the satisfaction of the Secretary . . . a service program 
designed to help children, where appropriate, return to families from which they have 
been removed o r  be placed for adoption o r  legal guardianship." Id. 
105. In fact, the regulations that have been promulgated pursuant to the Act expressly 
provide that the state must set forth with specificity in its Child Welfare Plan "which 
preplacement preventive and reunification services are available to children and families 
in need." 45 C.F.R. 5 1357.15(e)(1). 
106. See supra notes 43-105 and accompanying text. 
107. See supra notes 51-105 and accompanying text 
108. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra text accompanying note 92. 
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custody after the child has been placed in temporary foster care.l1° 
In addition, the foster parents may need a variety of services de- 
pending on the age, and physical and mental well-being of the child. 
The services needed by the children will vary on a case by case basis, 
but will often include psychological counseling to help them cope 
emotionally with the problems that lead to government action.lll 
For states that do not comply with the Act, however, federal finan- 
cial assistance will be reduced or e1iminated.l l2  No other remedy is 
explicitly provided for in the Act. While the Act is a major step in 
the right direction in terms of trying to achieve foster care reform, it 
is clear from the statistics1 l5 that additional measures are necessary. 
Permitting section 1983 claims can and does go a long way toward 
making the Act a more effective tool for achieving foster care re- 
form. Part I1 of this article analyzes the cases that have considered 
section 1983 claims under the Act. 
Section 1983'14 permits a cause of action against any person who 
acts under color of state law,l15 if that person deprives the plaintiff 
"of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws" of the United States.l16 These claims are permitted for 
rights created by federal statutes, as well as those created by the 
Constitution,ll7 and allow private persons who were intended bene- 
ficiaries of federal legislation to enforce it unless one of two circum- 
stances exist. First, if "the statute [does] not create enforceable 
110. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
11 1. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
112. 9 671(b). A state may be in compliance with Title IV-B and receive federal 
financial participation for child welfare services generally, while not in compliance with 
Title IV-E. Alternatively, a state may be in compliance with some but not all of Title IV- 
E, in which case they may receive some federal financial assistance, but not as much as 
they would if they were in total compliance with the Act. For the text of 3 671(b), see 
supra note 20. 
1 13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
114. 5 1983 provides, in part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper for redress. 
115. Id. Municipalities and local government officials can also be sued under 8 1983. 
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
1 16. 5 1983. 
117. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). 
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rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of section 
1983" the claim will not be allowed.I18 Second, Congress may, in 
the statute itself, "foreclose enforcement" under section 1983.119 
The following subsections analyze these exceptions to section 1983 
claims in relation to the Child Welfare Act.lZ0 
118. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2516-17 n.9 (1990); Golden 
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444, 448 (1989); Wright v. City of 
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,423 (1987); seegenerally Henry P. 
Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233 
(1991) (explaining importance of Court's opinion in Golden Slate Transit, 110 S. Ct. 444, 
which emphasized broad reach of 5 1983 and importance of underlying fundamental 
right). 
119. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2517; Golden State Transit, 110 S. Ct. at 448-49; Wright, 479 
U.S. at 423. As the Court in Golden State explained: 
In all cases, the availability of the 5 1983 remedy turns on whether the 
statute, by its terms or as interpreted, creates obligations "sufficiently 
specific and definite" to be within "the competence of the judiciary to 
enforce," is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff, and is not 
foreclosed "by express provision or other specific evidence from the 
statute itself." 
110 S. Ct. at 449 (citations omitted). 
While it is easy to articulate the principles governing 8 1983 claims, the division 
among Supreme Court justices in recent cases illustrates the difficulty in applying the 
principles. See, e.g., Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2525 (5-4 decision); Golden State Transit, 110 
S.Ct. at 447 (6-3 decision); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 5, 
32, 33 (1981) (5-1-3 decision); Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 2, 11 (6-3 decision). 
120. While this section discusses whether the Act gives rise to a cause of action under 
O 1983, several courts have analyzed both the applicability of a 5 1983 claim and 
whether the Act itself creates an implied private right of action. See Artist M. v. Johnson, 
917 F.2d 980,987 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. grantedsub nom. Suter v. Artist M., 11 1 S. Ct. 2008 
(1991); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1404-05 (N.D. 111. 1989). Unlike 5 1983, 
which constitutes explicit congressional authority to sue state officials for violations of 
federal rights under appropriate circumstances, an implied right of action exists when a 
court concludes that despite its silence, Congress intended to create a private right of 
action directly under the applicable statute. The ultimate question in implied right cases 
is "whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action." Karahalios v. 
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 532 (1989) (quoting 
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981)); Transamerica Mortgage Advisers v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (setting forth 
four prong test to determine whether implied right of action exists). See also Thompson 
v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) ("[C]ongressional intent can be inferred from 
the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source."). If the 
statute already provides a remedy for violations, courts are less likely to find that 
Congress intended to create an implied private right of action. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 
532-33. 
The courts in Artist and B.H. concluded that a private right of action is implicit under 
the Child Welfare Act. 917 F.2d at 987; 715 F. Supp. at 1402. The court in B.H. 
reasoned that the analysis of implied rights of action is similar to the congressional 
foreclosure analysis under 5 1983. 715 F. Supp. at 1404; see infra notes 121-138 and 
accompanying text. Because the court held that there was no congressional foreclosure 
under 5 1983, it found an implied right of action under the Act. 715 F. Supp. at 1404- 
05. Similarly, the court in Artisr found an implied private right of action noting that the 
"inquiry closely resembles the analysis courts use to determine whether a Section 1983 
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A. Congressional Foreclosure 
Although a plaintiff may possess a right created by a federal stat- 
ute, Congress may foreclose enforcement of that right. A section 
1983 plaintiff must specify the provision of a statute that creates a 
federal right, but the burden of proof is on the defendant to show 
that Congress foreclosed enforcement of that right.1z1 Although 
the argument has been made in cases that have arisen under the 
Child Welfare Act that Congress foreclosed section 1983 causes of 
action, the courts have easily rejected that argument.'z2 Congress 
did not explicitly foreclose section 1983 suits in the Act.Iz3 In the 
absence of such an express statement, the Supreme Court has indi- 
cated that section 1983 claims may be foreclosed when the remedial 
scheme is "sufficiently comprehensive . . . to demonstrate congres- 
sional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under s 1983."*24 
The Child Welfare Act's remedial scheme is anything but compre- 
hensive. The Act's focus is on the establishment of a framework for 
the smooth operation of state foster care systems, rather than on 
remedies for state failures to comply with the Act. The primary 
remedy provided for by the Act is the termination or reduction of 
federal financial assistance for states that no longer comply with its 
cause of action exists." 917 F.2d at 989. Arguably, congressional silence about private 
enforcement favors a finding of 8 1983 rights. Congress may have been silent because it 
believed it was unnecessary, in light of J 1983, to explicitly establish private 
enforcement provisions. 
121. W i h ,  110 S. Ct. at 2523 ("The burden is on the State to show 'by express 
provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to 
foreclose such private enforcement.' ") (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 423); Golden State 
Transit, 110 S. Ct. at 448-49; Wright, 479 U.S. at 423-24 ("We do not lightly conclude 
that Congress intended to preclude reliance on 3 1983 as a remedy 'for the deprivation 
of a federally secured right.' ") (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)). 
122. See, e.g., Artist, 917 F.2d at 988-89 ("In light of the limited nature of the review 
provisions under the [Child Welfare] Act and the lack of any comprehensive remedial 
scheme, Congress did not intend to foreclose resort to Section 1983 as a cause of action 
under the [Act]."); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 509-10 (1st Cir. 1983) (affirming 
district court holding that plaintiffs could enforce various provisions of Title IV-E of 
Social Security Act with 8 1983); Lashawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 989 (D.D.C. 
1991) (holding that Child Welfare Act "creates obligations 'sufficiently specific and 
definite' to be within 'the competence of the judiciary to enforce' . . . and is not 
foreclosed 'by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself.' ") 
(quoting Golden Stale Transit, 110 S. Ct. at 449); B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1403-04 (holding 
that existence of administrative remedies did not foreclose resort to 5 1983 remedy). 
123. See supra notes 15-120 and accompanying text. 
124. l.Vilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)); see ako Golden Stale Transit, 110 S. Ct. at 
448-49 ("[Tlhe statutory framework must be such that 'allowing a plaintiff' to bring a 
8 1983 action 'would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme.' ") 
(quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)). 
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provisions.125 The Act also gives individuals who have been denied 
benefits the right to a hearing.l26 Finally, the Child Welfare Act re- 
quires the state to conduct a dispositional hearing within eighteen 
months after the child's original placement in foster care to deter- 
mine the future plans for the child.127 
The Supreme Court has clearly rejected the argument that the 
ability to reduce or terminate funds is sufficient to find Congres- 
sional foreclosure.l28 Nor has it found the right to a hearing suffi- 
cient to constitute congressional foreclosure of section 1983 
claims.l29 In only two cases has the Supreme Court found remedial 
schemes sufficiently comprehensive to constitute congressional 
foreclosure of section 1983 claims.150 In both cases, the remedial 
schemes were much more comprehensive than the remedies pro- 
vided in the Child Welfare Act. 
125. See supra notes 20 & 112 and accompanying text. Defendants in Lynch, 719 F.2d 
at 5 11, contended that Congress intended the reduction or termination of funds to be 
the sole remedy under the Act and that J 1983 suits were, therefore, foreclosed. Id. at 
5 10. 
126. J 671(a)(12); see supra note 44. As the court in Lynch observed, the right to a 
hearing "is not really responsive to cases such as this one . . . where a class alleges 
systemic malfeasance. Such problems are treated inefficiently if they must be pursued 
individually." 719 F.2d at 512. 
127. J 675(5)(C); see supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
128. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970): 
We have considered and rejected the argument that a federal court is 
without power to review state welfare provisions or prohibit the use of 
federal funds by the States in view of the fact that Congress has lodged in 
the Department of HEW the power to cut off federal funds for 
noncompliance with statutory requirements. 
See also Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2519 (explaining that Boren Amendment created right to 
reasonable rent and utility rates that can be enforced by federal courts under J 1983); 
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,423-24 (1987) 
(holding that authority of HUD to enforce benefits for housing project tenants did not 
exclude private enforcement in the courts under J 1983). 
' 129. See Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2524 ("We . . . reject petitioners' argument that the 
existence of administrative procedures . . . evidences an intent to foreclose a private 
remedy in the federal courts."); Wright, 479 U.S. at 426-27; Patsy v. Board of Regents, 
457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). In fact, in cases arising under the Social Security Act, the 
Court traditionally has allowed 8 1983 claims, see, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 
(1980); Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 131 (1979); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 
729-30 n.3 (1978); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 284 n.2 (1971); Rosado, 397 U.S. 
at 401; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 31 1 (1968), and has required an express statement 
of intent to foreclose claims. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975) 
(construing 42 'U.S.C. J 405(h), which provides that suit is only permissible by way of 
judicial review provisions set forth in statute). 
130. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992. I01 1 (1984) (discussing remedies of Education 
of Handicapped Act); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers 
Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (discussing remedies of Federal Research and Sanctuaries 
Act). 
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In the first foreclosure case, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 
National Sea Clammers Ass'n,13' the Court found that the comprehen- 
sive enforcement mechanism under the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA) and the Maine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) indicated that Congress intended to fore- 
close section 1983 claims.'32 The FWPCA and the MPRSA, unlike 
the Child Welfare Act, provided that any interested person could 
seek judicial review in the United States courts of appeals of various 
actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency Administra- 
In addition, both Acts included citizen-suit provisions that 
"authorize[d] private persons to sue for injunctions to enforce these 
statutes."134 
Similarly, in Smith v. R ~ b i w o n , ' ~ ~  the statute at issue, the Educa- 
tion of the Handicapped Act (EHA), provided for private judicial 
enforcement of its provisions.136 The Court in Smith held that Con- 
gress foreclosed section 1983 to assert constitutional equal protec- 
tion claims, finding that such claims were virtually identical to those 
permitted under the EHA, and that the EHA was "intended . . . to 
be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert . . . 
equal protection claim[s] ." 
Unlike the FWPCA, MPRSA, and EHA, the Child Welfare Act has 
no such provision for private judicial enforcement of its require- 
ments.lS8 That is precisely why section 1983 claims are needed. 
Since each court that has addressed the issue of congressional fore- 
closure under the Child Welfare Act has rejected it, the remainder 
of the discussion will focus on whether the Act creates enforceable 
"rights" for purposes of section 1983. 
B. Enforceable Rights Within the Meaning of Section 1983 
In order to determine whether there is an enforceable right within 
the meaning of section 1983, a court must assess whether the fed- 
eral statutory provision "was intend[ed] to benefit the putative 
131. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
132. Id. at 20-21. 
133. Id. at 13-14. 
134. Id. at 14. The FWPCA and MPRSA also provided for enforcement by 
government officials who were empowered to sue for violations of the Acts and to seek 
civil or criminal penalties. Id. at 13. 
135. 468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
136. Id. at 1010. 
137. Id. at 1009-12. 
138. See Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980, 988-89 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The Act does 
not provide for private citizen suits directly or the right to judicial review or a 
comprehensive system of  procedures and guarantees."), cerl. granted sub ,lorn. Suter v. 
Artist M., 1 1  1 S. Ct. 2008 (1991). 
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plaintiff."'39 If it was so intended, he or  she should have a cause of 
action under section 1983 unless: 1) the statute merely sets forth a 
"congressional preference" rather than creating a binding obliga- 
tion on the governmental unit;l40 or  2) the statute is "too vague and 
amorphous" so that it is "beyond the competence of the judiciary to 
e n f ~ r c e . ' ' ~ * ~  
With these rules as a guide, it is clear that the Child Welfare Act 
creates enforceable rights. First, the Act was enacted for the benefit 
of children in foster care, children at risk of entering the foster care 
system, and their biological and foster parents or other caretakers. 
As Part I of this article explains, the Act requires states to provide, 
for children and their families: 1) preventive services to help reduce 
the need for foster care, 2) proper care to children in foster care, 
and 3) permanency planning services.142 The Act creates a foster 
care framework within which states should be able to provide these 
services. It is difficult to imagine whom this framework was in- 
tended to benefit if not the children and their  caretaker^.'“^ 
Second, Congress created rights in the Child Welfare Act that are 
enforceable in a section 1983 action. The argument to the contrary 
is that the Child Welfare Act simply provides federal financial assist- 
ance to states that wish to comply with its provisions, but that states 
are free to forego such assistance rather than comply with the Act. 
Therefore, the argument continues, the Act is nothing more than a 
statement of congressional preference. 
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, that argument must 
be rejected.144 In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital A ~ s ' n , ' ~ ~  the Court up- 
139. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 1 10 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1990) (quoting Golden 
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444, 448 (1989)). 
140. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981). 
141. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2517; Golden State Transit, 110 S. Ct. at 448; Wright v. City of 
Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431 (1987). 
142. See supra notes 52- 1 1 1 and accompanying text. 
143. Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d. 980, 987 (7th Cir. 1990) ("That Congress 
enacted the [Act] to benefit children such as those in the plaintiff classes cannot be 
seriously disputed."), cert. granted sub nom. Suter v. Artist M., 11 1 S. Ct. 2008 (1991); 
LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959,989 (D.D.C. 1991); Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. 
Supp. 1182, 1188 (N.D. 111. 1990) ("[Bloth the child and the parents are 
beneficiaries. . . ."). 
144. The Supreme Court has found enforceable rights under funding statutes that 
provided federal financial assistance to states that voluntarily chose to participate in the 
federal scheme. See, e.g., LVilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2513, 2520: Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
326 (1980); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 401 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 
316-17, 333 (1968). But see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 
(1981) (holding that Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. 5 6010, did not create substantive rights; it only reflected a "congressional 
preference for certain kinds of treatment."). 
145. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990). 
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held a section 1983 claim under the Boren Amendment, which pro- 
vided federal financial assistance to states that complied with its 
requirements regarding medicaid, although participation in the pro- 
gram was v0luntary.'~6 The Court reasoned that because compli- 
ance with the federal statute was a condition precedent to the 
receipt of federal assistance, the statute set forth more than a con- 
gressional preference.14' As the Court explained: 
[The] provision of federal funds is expressly conditioned on 
compliance with the [Boren] Amendment and the Secretary is 
authorized to withhold funds for noncompliance. . . . "The 
[Boren Amendment's] language succinctly sets forth a con- 
gressional command, which is wholly uncharacteristic of a 
mere suggestion or nudge."148 
Because the Boren Amendment set forth a "congressional com- 
mand" or duty with which participating states had to comply, the 
plaintiffs had a right to enforce that 
In upholding the section 1983 claim, the Wilcler Court distin- 
guished an earlier case, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder- 
rnan,l5O which also involved a federal funding statute.151 In 
Pennhurst, the plaintiffs asserted a section 1983 claim, alleging that 
the state violated their right to "minimally adequate habitation in 
the least restrictive e n ~ i r o n m e n t , " ' ~ ~  under 42 U.S.C. 5 6010, part 
of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights 
Act.'53 The Court held that section 6010 did not create enforceable 
section 1983 rights because it was simply a provision of congres- 
sional findings; it was not one of the provisions that set forth condi- 
tions for the receipt of federal funds.154 As the Court observed, 
"Noticeably absent from 5 6010 is any language suggesting that 
$ 6010 is a 'condition' for the receipt of federal funding under the 
146. Id. at 2525. For a more detailed discussion of Wilder, see infra notes 178-91 and 
accompanying text. 
147. Id. at 2519. 
148. Id. at 2525 (citations omitted) (quoting West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 
F.2d 1 1 ,  20 (3d Cir. 1989)), a f ' d ,  1 1 1  S. Ct. 1138 (1991). 
149. See Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptionr as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
26 YALE LJ. 7 10, 7 17 (191 7); Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16, 31 (1913) (stating that under Hohfeldian 
terminology terms "right" and "duty" are jural correlatives). 
150. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
151. Id. at 11-14. 
152. Id. at 6. 
153. Id. at 13. 
154. Id. at 19. 
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Thus, the Court held that the findings in section 6010 sim- 
- 
ply set forth congressional preferences.15'j 
Unlike section 6010, the requirements of the Child Welfare Act 
are conditions to the federal government's agreement to provide fi- 
nancial assistance to states. States must create the Child Welfare 
Plan, Foster Care Plan, Case Plan, and Case Review System and 
render the services required pursuant thereto in order to receive 
federal funds.157 Thus, the Child Welfare Act, like the Boren 
Amendment in Wilder, sets forth more than a congressional prefer- 
ence; the Act creates binding obligations on states that accept fed- 
eral funds. 
Nevertheless, several courts have held that the Act does not create 
enforceable rights. In Spielman v. Hildebr~nd, '~~ for example, plain- 
tiffs alleged that officials of the Kansas Department of Social and 
Rehabilitation Services removed their foster child from their home 
without affording them the opportunity of a pre-removal hearing in 
violation of the Act.159 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
not only held that there was no enforceable right to a pre-removal 
hearing under section 67 1 (a)(12) of the Act, but also stated, "There 
is considerable doubt whether the [Act] confers any substantive 
rights that can be the subject of an action for damages under section 
1983."160 The court suggested that the Act essentially sets forth 
congressional preferences rather than mandating specific con- 
duct.IG1 While other courts have limited the scope of enforceable 
rights for purposes of section 1983, the United States Court of Ap- 
peals for the Tenth Circuit is one of the few courts to suggest that 
the Act, in its entirety, creates no enforceable rights.16* 
155. Id. at 13. 
156. Id. at 19. 
157. See supra notes 43-1 1 1 and accompanying text. 
158. 873 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989). 
159. Id. at 1381; see !j 671(a)(12). 
160. Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1386. The court relied, at least partially, on Pennhurst, 
which, as pointed out earlier, is distinguishable from claims brought under the Child 
Welfare Act. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text; see also Aristotle P .  v. 
Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D. 111. 1989) ("[Alny rights contained in [the Child 
Welfare Act] may not be enforced through a $ 1983 action."). 
161. Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1386. The court also held that the plaintiffs were not 
denied benefits under the Act. Id. 
162. There are state court opinions that reach the same conclusion as the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See In re Cynthia A., 514 A.2d 360, 365 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1986) ("The [Alct . . . is an appropriations act and does not apply to individual actions 
. . . but merely sets forth general guidelines for a state's continued eligibility to receive 
funds for foster care maintenance."); In re C.B.C. 810 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1991) (holding that Child Welfare Act is funding statute that "has no applicability to 
individual actions."). 
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Two provisions have been the subject of most of the litigation sur- 
rounding the Child Welfare Act. These provisions require states to: 
1) create a Case Plan'and Case Review System;163 and 2) use reason- 
able efforts to prevent removal of the child or to facilitate the child's 
return to home.164 The courts agree that the first provision is spe- 
cific enough to create an enforceable right for purposes of section 
1983, but there is less consensus about the latter,165 because some 
courts find the reasonable efforts requirement too vague and amor- 
phous to create enforceable rights.166 Attempts to enforce various 
other provisions of the Act have been largely unsuccessful. 
1. Case Plan and Case Review System Requirements 
The provision of the Child Welfare Act that has most frequently 
been used to assert the creation of a section 1983 right is section 
67 1 (a)(16), which requires that the state create a Case Plan and Case 
Review System.l6' Because the Act provides in mandatory terms 
that states create a Case Plan and Case Review System to qualify for 
federal financial assistance, and because the requirements of the 
Case Plan and Case Review System are set forth with specificity, the 
courts have uniformly found that section 671 (a)(16) creates enforce- 
able rights under section 1983.168 As the court in Lynch v. 
163. f 671(a)(16). 
164. f 671(a)(15). 
165. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text. 
166. See sources cited infra note 209. 
167. f 671(a)(16). See, e.g., Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(noting that f 671(a)(16) mandated that state provide for case plan and case review 
system), cot.  granted sub nom. Suter v. Artist M., 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991); Del A. v. 
Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir.) (holding that established rights of children to 
development of case plan and review system barred defense of qualified immunity in 
F) 1983 claim), reh'ggranted, 862 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1988), appeal dismissed, 867 F.2d 842 
(5th Cir. 1989); Darr ex rel. LJ. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that statute created standard of conduct and rights in plaintiff children), cmt. h i e d ,  488 
U.S. 1018 (1989); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 508-09 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that, 
in order for state to receive funding, state must create case plan and review 
requirements and that individuals can enforce through f 1983); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 
762 F. Supp. 959, 962 (D.D.C. 1991) (noting requirement that district social workers 
prepare written case plans); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (N.D. 111. 1989) 
(holding that Child Welfare Act created "an enforceable right to an individualized 'case 
plan' and 'case review system' "). 
168. See, e.g., Edwards, 855 F.2d at 1154 (holding that inaction on part of state officials 
was unreasonable and fell below standard of conduct set forth by Child Welfare Act, 
creating cause of action under f 1983); Lynch, 719 F.2d at 509 (holding that Title IV-E 
entitled plaintiff to rights enforceable in f 1983 cause of action); B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 
1402 (holding that provisions of Child Welfare Act imposed affirmative obligation on 
state that was enforceable in f 1983 cause of action); cf. Artist, 917 F.2d at 988 (holding 
that, although Act related primarily to appropriations, it created privately enforceable 
rights under f 1983); Massinga, 838 F.2d at 123 (holding that violations of Child Welfare 
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Dukakis L69 explained, section 675(1), unlike the former plan require- 
ment in Title IV-A, "provide[s] . . . an explicit definition of a 
plan."170 The Case Plan, for example, must include specific infor- 
mation and provide for ensuring that every child in foster care re- 
ceive "proper care," which is defined to iriclude both the physical 
and emotional well-being of the child.171 In addition, the Case Re- 
view System requires that each child's status be reviewed at stated 
intervals and sets forth both procedural and substantive guidelines 
for the manner in which the reviews are to be ~ 0 n d u c t e d . I ~ ~  Be- 
cause the requirements of the Case Plan and the Case Review Sys- 
tem are clearly defined in the Act, courts are in agreement that 
section 671(a)(16) gives rise to a section 1983 right.L73 
2. Reasonable Efforts 
The reasonable efforts r e q ~ i r e m e n t , ' ~ ~  unlike the Case Plan and 
Case Review System, is not defined in the Act.L75 Accordingly, it is 
arguably too vague and amorphous to enforce under section 1983. 
This important requirement of the Act, however, is specific enough 
to create section 1983 rights for several reasons. First, the United 
States Constitution uses reasonableness as a standard of behavior. 
The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be rea- 
sonable.176 Courts regularly determine, on a case by case basis, 
Act were privately enforceable under § 1983); LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 989 (holding 
that 8 1983 was available to enforce rights conferred by Adoption Assistance Act); In re 
Ashley K., 571 N.E.2d 905,917-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that five years and four 
months between foster placement and final disposition was not reasonable time). 
169. 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983). 
170. Id. at 507. 
171. 3 675(5)(A). For a detailed discussion of the Case Plan requirements, see supra 
note 63-94 and accompanying text. 
172. 5 675(5)(B). For a detailed discussion of the Case Review System requirements, 
see supra note 95-0 13 and accompanying text. 
173. That the Case Plan and Case Review System requirements are tailored to 
individual cases also supports the idea of individual remedies. 
174. See Shotton, supra note 13, at 225-26. 
175. Reasonable efforts must be made prior to placement to prevent or eliminate the 
need for foster care placement. $671(a)(15). In addition, reasonable efforts must be 
made, for children in foster care, to return them to their homes. Id.; see supra note 91 
and accompanying text. Given the importance of the reasonable efforts provision, 
Congress' failure to define reasonable efforts is unfortunate. Some states. have been 
more elaborate in defining child welfare services. See, e.g., N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law 8 409 
(McKinney Supp. 1991). Congress should consider amending the Act to clarify it. 
Nonetheless, the Act's present language is sufficiently specific to create an enforceable 
right. 
176. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated."). 
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whether that standard of reasonableness has been satisfied.177 Sec- 
ond, the Supreme Court has, in other federal funding cases, found 
the standard of reasonableness enforceable for purposes of section 
1983. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n,178 for example, involved a 
challenge under the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act.179 The 
amendment required participating states to reimburse health care 
providers for medical services renderedto the needy.180 Federal fi- 
nancial assistance was then provided to states that complied with the 
requirements of the Boren Amendment, although participation in 
the program was v01untary.l~~ In order to receive federal financial 
assistance the state had to have a "plan for medical assistance"l8* 
that, among other things, provided for reimbursing health care 
providers. The amendment further required that the reimburse- 
ment rates be "reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which 
must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated 
facilities." la4 
In Wilder, a health care provider sued the state for failing to set 
reasonable and adequate reimbursement rates.185 The state argued 
that the Medicaid Act did not create an enforceable right, in part, 
because it was too vague and amorphous.186 Despite the fact that 
the Act did not define reasonable and adequate, the court found 
that the plaintiff had a valid section 1983 claim.la7 The Court rea- 
soned that the "reasonable and adequate" standard was specific 
enough to enforce, in part, because the statute and regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the Boren Amendment set forth factors 
for the states to consider in adopting its rates.la8 In addition, the 
177. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1985) (holding that use of deadly 
force against fleeing, unarmed, nondangerous suspect was unconstitutional unless 
suspect posed serious threat); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,748-53 (1984) (holding 
that presumption of unreasonableness attached to all warrantless home entries). 
178. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990). 
179. Id. at 2513. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 2510. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 2514. It also required "reasonable access" to eligible participants. Id. at 
2512. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 2522. 
187. Id. at 2522-23. 
188. Id. at 2522. These factors included: 
(1) the unique situation (financial and otherwise) of a hospital that serves 
a disproportionate number of low income patients, (2) the statutory 
requirements for adequate care in a nursing home, and (3) the special 
situation of hospitals providing inpatient care when long term care at a 
nursing home would be sufficient but is unavailable. 
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reasonableness of the rates were to be measured against the "objec- 
tive benchmark of an efficiently and economically operated facil- 
i t ~ . " l 8 ~  Thus, although the states had considerable flexibility in 
establishing rates, including the ability to use various methods to 
calculate them, their discretion was not unlimited.'gO As the Court 
explained: 
While there may be a range of reasonable rates, there certainly 
are some rates outside that range that no State could ever find 
to be reasonable and adequate under the Act. Although some 
knowledge of the hospital industry might be required to evalu- 
ate a State's findings with respect to the reasonableness of its 
rates, such an inquiry is well within the competence of the 
judiciary.Ig1 
In addition to its opinion in Wilder, the Supreme Court held, in 
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment €9 Housing Authority, Ig2 that the 
use of the term "reasonable" as a standard of conduct was not too 
vague and amorphous to create an enforceable right.lg3 In Wright, 
the Court upheld a section 1983 claim based on the Brooke Amend- 
ment to the Housing Act of 1937, which limited the amount of rent 
that could be charged to a public housing tenant.Ig4 The Brooke 
Amendment required the inclusion of a reasonable allowance in the 
rent for utilities.Ig5 Petitioners in Wright were low income public 
housing tenants who alleged that they had been charged too much 
- an unreasonable amount - for utilities, in violation of the 
Brooke Amendment.lg6 The Court rejected the argument that the 
provision for reasonable utilities was too vague and amorphous, 
concluding that the regulations included sufficient guidelines to cre- 
ate an enforceable right.lg7 The Court's reliance in Wilder and 
Id. 
189. Id. at 2523. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. (footnote omitted). 
192. 479 U.S. 418 (1987). 
193. Id. at 432. 
194. Id. at 429-30. 
195. Id. at 431. 
196. Id. at 421. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that a surcharge for excess utility 
consumption that should have been part of their rent had been improperly imposed by 
the defendants. Id. The amount of rent was generally limited to a percentage of the 
family income. Id at 420 n.2. 
197. Id. at 431-32. The regulations 
require housing authorities . . . to . . . [calculate] their utility allowances 
on the basis of current data, to set the allowances in such a fashion so that 
90 percent of a particular authority's dwelling units d o  not pay 
surcharges, and to review tenant surcharges quarterly and consider 
revision of the allowances if more than 25 percent of any category of 
units are being surcharged. 
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Wright on the regulations promulgated by the overseeing federal 
agencies, or some other objective benchmark in order to measure 
compliance with federal laws, suggests that the Court is looking for 
some limitation on the discretion of a state agency when the statu- 
tory language is broad, in order to find sufficient specificity for a 
section 1983 right. 
The regulations promulgated under the Child Welfare Act pro- 
vide an objective benchmark that suggest specific services which 
may satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement. The regulation that 
reiterates the reasonable efforts requirementlg8 cross references the 
regulation setting forth specific types of child welfare services,1Qg 
which suggests that the provision of the same or similar services will 
satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement. These specific examples 
of reasonable services give states as much guidance as the regula- 
tions in Wilder and Wright. Although the states have flexibility to as- 
sess each family situation and determine what services are needed to 
satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement in a given ~ase,~OO the 
specific examples illustrated in the regulations give states sufficient 
guidance to enable them to understand the meaning of the 
requirement.201 
In addition to the regulations, the language of the Act is suffi- 
ciently specific to render the reasonable efforts requirement en- 
forceable for purposes of section 1983. Because the Act clearly sets 
Id. at 421-22 n.4. 
198. 45 C.F.R. 8 1356.21(b). 
199. 45  C.F.R. 5 1357.15(e). 
200. In Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (N.D. Ill. 1990). the court 
rejected the defendant's argument that "permitting enforcement [would] unduly 
deprive the state of flexibility and discretion in providing child welfare services." As the 
court explained, "[a] standard of 'reasonable efforts' is a flexible standard that leaves 
much to the discretion of the states." Id. 
201. In addition to the regulations, the National Council ofJuvenile and Family Court 
Judges, the Child Welfare League of America, the Youth Law Center, and the National 
Center for Youth Law have produced reasonable efforts guidelines. NATIONAL COUNCIL 
OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES ET AL., EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION, 
MAKING REASONABLE FFORTS: STEPS FOR KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER 59 (no 
publication date) [hereinafter MAKING REASONABLE EFFORTS]. It has been suggested that 
states follow a three-step process to determine what efforts are reasonable in any given 
case: 
The  steps include: (1) identifying the exact danger that puts the child at 
risk of placement and that justifies state intervention; (2) determining 
how the family problems are causing or contributing to this danger to the 
child; and 3) designing and providing services for the family that alleviate 
o r  diminish the danger to the child. 
Shotton, supra note 13, at 226. Reasonable efforts d o  not require "unreasonable ef- 
forts." In re Kenny F., 786 P.2d 699, 703 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) ("When it becomes clear 
that preserving the family is not compatible with protecting the child, further eforts at 
preservation are not required."). 
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forth the goals of the reasonable efforts requirements - to prevent 
the need for removal of the child from his or her home and, for 
those children who have been removed, to return them home - the 
reasonable efforts requirement is not too open ended for trained 
professionals to de~ipher.2~2 
In addition to the Supreme Court's decisions suggesting that the 
term "reasonable" is sufficiently specific to give rise to enforceable 
rights, basic common law principles support the same conclusion. 
Virtually every first year law student learns that the requirement of 
reasonableness is used throughout the law to enforce rights. One of 
the basic principles of negligence law, for example, is that each indi- 
vidual must act as a reasonable person of ordinary prudence under 
the same or  similar circumstances.203 What is "reasonable" is al- 
most completely undefined204 and is determined by the fact finder 
on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, we all have a right to expect 
that others will exercise their duty to use reasonable care and if we 
are injured as a result of their failure to use such care, we have a 
cause of action in negligence.205 
The standard of reasonableness is used not only in tort law, but in 
contract law. For example, a promisor may have a duty to use best 
or  reasonable efforts.206 Other references to reasonableness as an 
enforceable standard are not uncommon in contracts law.207 Thus, 
202. For example, if a child is at risk of being removed from the home because the 
parents have run out of money and cannot afford to feed him, the reasonable efforts 
requirement may include a cash payment to the parents or the purchase of food for the 
family. See Carol R. Golubuck, Cash Assistance to Families: An Essential Component of 
Reasonable Eforts to Prevent and Eliminate Foster Care Placement of Their Children, 19 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1393, 1398 (1986). 
203. W. PACE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 8 30 (5th 
ed. 1984). This assumes the existence of a duty. Id. 
204. Id. at 8 31. The finder of fact must weigh the risk versus the utility of the conduct 
along with the burden involved in acting in a safer manner. Id. 
205. Id. at 8 30. This assumes the existence of a duty and proximate cause. Id. The 
reasonable efforts requirement is analogous to the common law duty to use reasonable 
care in the sense that reasonable efforts requires an assessment of a family's problem on 
a case by case basis, and a determination of what conduct would be reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
206. See, e.g., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing, 454 F. Supp. 258, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
aff 'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979); Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff Gordon, 1 18 N.E. 2 14.2 15 
(N.Y. 1917). The duty to use reasonable efforts may be based on an express provision in 
the contract. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 260. Alternatively, a court may infer a duty to use 
reasonable efforts when the promisee is completely, o r  in large part, dependent on the 
efforts of the promisor to receive the benefit of the bargain. M'ood, 118 N.E. at 214. 
207. It is well-settled, for example, that if an offer is silent with respect to how long it 
will remain effective, it will lapse after a "reasonable" time. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
FARNSWORTH O N  CONTRACTS 8 3.19 (2d ed. 1990). It is up to the court to determine, 
given a specific set of circumstances, what is reasonable in a given situation. Article 2 of 
the uniform Commercial Code also uses "reasonableness" as a standard in various 
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reference to contract and tort law suggests that the duty to use rea- 
sonable efforts under the Child Welfare Act is not too vague and 
amorphous for courts to enforce. 
Given the well-settled use of reasonableness as a standard 
in the United States Constitution, tort and contract law, and the 
foregoing decisions of the Supreme Court,*08 it is not surprising 
that several courts have upheld section 1983 claims based up- 
, on the reasonable efforts requirement.209 In Art& M. v. John- 
circumstances. See, e.g., U.C.C. $ 2-201 (1990) (establishing that satisfaction of statute of 
frauds in case between merchants depends on whether written confirmation is received 
within reasonable time by party asserting statute of frauds defense); U.C.C. $ 2-207 
(1990) (establishing definite and seasonable expression of acceptance of written 
confirmation sent within reasonable time will generally constitute an acceptance even if 
it is not mirror image of offer); U.C.C. $ 2-306 (1990) (establishing that no unreasonable 
quantity is permissible in output or requirements contracts). 
208. See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990); Wright v. City 
of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987). 
209. See Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980, 989 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. 
Suter v. Artist M., 11 1 S. Ct. 2008 (1991); cf: Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148, 1154 
(5th Cir.) (holding that reasonable person would have known that inaction was 
unlawful), rehbgranted, 862 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1988), appeal dismissed, 867 F.2d 842 (5th 
Cir. 1989); Darr ex rel. LJ. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that 
official could reasonably be expected to know that failure to comply with statute would 
violate constitutional rights of children), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989); LaShawn A. v. 
Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 970, 986 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that District of Columbia 
Child and Family Services Division failed to use reasonable efforts to protect children); 
Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1 182, 1185-87 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding reasonable 
efforts requirement to be flexible standard that leaves much to discretion of states). But 
see Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that rights 
created by Child Welfare Act were too amorphous to be enforceable); B.H. v. Johnson, 
715 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
A number of state court cases have also suggested that "reasonable efforts" created an 
enforceable right. See, e.g., In re Amy M., 283 Cal. Rptr. 788, 791-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that reasonable efforts were made prior to child's removal from home); In re 
Bums, 519 A.2d 638,648-49 (Del. 1986) (holding that state failed to provide reasonable 
efforts to prevent need for placement or to reunify family when mother needed 
housing); In re M.H., 444 N.W.2d 110, 11 1-13 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that 
transportation for medical care and additional clothing would have been reasonable 
efforts to keep child at home); In re Kenny F . ,  786 P.2d 699, 703-04 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1990) (finding that reasonable efforts were made prior to termination of parental rights 
when mother made no effort to maintain contact with child and approved plan for state 
to seek termination of her parental rights); In re S.A.D, 555 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1989) (discussine Monroe Countv Children and Youth Services failed to use reasonable 
, . "
efforts to eliminate need for placement when it advised mother, who had no money and 
no home, that "her only alternative was to . . . place her child in custody . . . until she 
could find a place to stay."). Bul see In re Cynthia A., 514 A.2d 360, 366 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1986) (holding that reasonable efforts requirement was not privately enforceable). Not 
infrequently, however, the state court decisions are based on compatible state statutes 
rather than on the Child Welfare Act. See, e.g., In re M.A. 408 N.W.2d 227, 235-36 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that reasonable efforts were based on MINN. STAT. 
$ 260.22 1 (b)(5) (1986)). 
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son,2I0 the plaintiffs alleged that the Illinois Department of Children 
and Family Services (DCFS)2I1 failed to use reasonable efforts to 
eliminate the need for foster care and that they failed to use reason- 
able efforts to return those who were in foster care back h0me.2~2 
The court rejected the state's argument that this provision was too 
vague and amorphous to enforce,213 finding Wilder and Wright con- 
trolling.214 By enforcing the reasonable efforts requirement, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit effectively 
overruled two earlier Illinois district court cases that found the pro- 
vision too vague and amorphous to enforce,Z15 while agreeing with 
yet a third Illinois district court opinion that had upheld a section 
1983 claim based upon the reasonable efforts requirement.216 The 
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Artist, however, renders the 
private enforceability of the reasonable efforts provision uncertain. 
In the most recent federal case to address the reasonable efforts 
requirement, LaShawn A. v. D k ~ o n , ~ ~ ~  the defendants, District of Co- 
lumbia officials, conceded that they had insufficient resources to sat- 
isfy the reasonable efforts requirement.2I8 Consistent with this 
admission, the court found that the reasonable efforts requirement 
210. 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1990), cer?. granted sub nom. Suter v. Artist M., 11 1 S. Ct. 
2008 (1991). 
2 1 1. -Officials of the Illinois DCFS have been the defendants in several 9 1983 suits 
arising under the Act. See, e.g., B.H., 715 F.2d at 1389; Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1184 
(ordering DCFS to make reasonable efforts aimed at returning children to homes); 
Aristotb, 721 F.Supp. at 1004 (discussing children who were wards of court and who sued 
officials of DCFS alleging violations of due process and associational rights). 
2 12. Arttit, 91 7 F.2d at 983. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of 9 67 1 (a)(9), (16). Id. 
The court found that these combined ~rovisions created enforceable rights. Id. at 988. 
" 
The court's discussion, however, focused on the reasonable efforts requirement, and the 
court explicitly found it specific enough to enforce. Id. at 987. 
213. Id. at 986. The state also argued that the Act did not create binding obligations 
and that the reasonable efforts provision was not intended to benefit the plaintiffclass of 
children. Id. 
214. Id. at 987. The court concluded that the state chose to meet the reasonable 
efforts requirement through the use of caseworkers and that without caseworkers little if 
any effort would be made to comply with the requirement. Id. Therefore, it ordered the 
timely assignment of caseworkers. Id.; see infra notes 273-75 and accompanying text. 
2 15. See, e.g. Aristotle, 72 1 F.Supp. at 1012 (" '[Rleasonable efforts to reunify families' 
[is] amorphous and not subject to precise definition."); B.H. ,  715 F. Supp. at 1401 ("[W] 
d o  not believe Congress intended to create an enforceable individual right of placement 
in the least restrictiie (most family-like) setting o r  of 'reasonable efforts' to eliminate the 
necessity of removing the child from the home or to return to a child home."). 
216. See Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 (N.D. Ill. 1990). The court in 
Nonnan upheld a 8 1983 claim when impoverished parents alleged that the Illinois DCFS 
failed to use reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for foster care by removing 
children from the parents home without first attempting to help the parents find 
adequate housing or providing emergency food, cash, or other necessary services. 
217. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991). 
218. Id. at 970. 
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had not been satisfied.219 The court's discussion appeared to as- 
sume that the reasonable efforts requirement was privately enforce- 
able without explicitly saying so. Instead, the court in LaShawn 
indicated that the Act as a whole created enforceable rights.220 With 
the many thousands of children straining state child welfare agency 
resources, it is ironic that state agencies in many cases must be com- 
pelled by the courts to satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement to 
prevent placement since prevention is less costly than p la~ement .2~~ 
3. Combined Provisions 
At least one federal case, Darr ex rel. L.J. v. M a s ~ i n g a , ~ ~ ~  has ad- 
dressed both the Case Plan and Case Review System, and the rea- 
sonable efforts requirements of the Child Welfare Act. The court 
was faced with broad allegations that the foster care system was mis- 
managed, and that as a result, the children "were victims of physical 
and sexual abuse as well as medical neglect."229 The plaintiffs al- 
leged that the state violated their right to proper care, failed to 
maintain foster care standards that were "reasonably in accord with 
recommended standards of national organizations," and failed to 
comply with the requirements of the Case Plan and Case Review 
System and the duty to report when it had reason to believe that a 
foster home or institution was unsuitable.224 The expert testimony 
supported the claim that there were "systemic dejciencies" in the foster 
care ~ystem.22~ Rather than finding that an isolated provision of the 
Act gave rise to a section 1983 claim, the court found that section 
671(a)(9), (lo), and (16) "taken together, . . . spell[ed] out a stan- 
dard of conduct, and as a corollary rights in plaintiffs."226 
Like Massinga, the court in LaShawn A. v. Di.xonZ2' was faced with 
systemic deficiencies in a foster care system.228 The court found 
that "[iln almost every area of the federal law, the District's child 
welfare system was deficient,"229 and found that numerous provi- 
219. Id. at 986. 
220. Id. at 989; see infra note 232-33 and accompanying text. 
221. See infra notes 333-36 and accompanying text. 
222. 838 F.2d 1 18 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. h i e d ,  488 U.S.  1018 (1989). 
223. Id. at 119. 
224. Id. at 123. Accordingly, plaintiffs alleged violations of $3  671 (a)(9)-(lo), (16). 
Id. 
225. Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
226. Id. at 123. 
227. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991). 
228. Id. at 989. 
229. Id. 
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sions of the Act had been vi0lated.23~ The court in LaShawn, relying 
in part on Massinga, did not specify, section by section, which provi- 
sions of the Child Welfare Act created enforceable rights. Instead, 
the court concluded, as a general matter, that the Act created en- 
forceable rights.Z5' These provisions are extraordinarily specific, 
spelling out exactly what a state must do for children in its care in 
order to receive funding under the The court in LaShawn 
appeared to recognize that the Act created a comprehensive scheme 
with which the District of Columbia failed to comply.253 
4. Other Provisions 
Several other provisions of the Child Welfare Act have been ad- 
dressed by the courts and found not to create enforceable rights. 
For example, in Scrivner v. Andrew~,~~* and Winston v. Delaware County 
Children & Youth Seruices,235 the plaintiffs, who were the biological 
parents, alleged that the state agencies responsible for administer- 
ing the foster care systems deprived them of the right to meaningful 
visitation, in violation of the A ~ t . 2 ~ ~  In both cases, the plaintiffs 
were allowed visitation privileges for only one hour every two 
weeks.237 Finding no statutory provision that explicitly or implicitly 
230. Id. at 986-87. The court found, for example, that the District of Columbia 
Children and Family Services Division (CFSD) had "consistently failed to use 
'reasonable efforts' to prevent the removal of children from their homes or to provide 
the services necessary to reunite them with their families when removal cannot be 
avoided." Id. at 986. This violated 1 671(a)(15). The court also found, among other 
things, that the CFSD consistently failed to: 1) "place children in the least restrictive 
placements in close proximity to their families"; 2) "provide services once children are 
. . . placed in foster care"; 3) "prepare written case plans"; and 4) "ensure that the 
children in . . . custody receive timely . . . reviews." LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 986; see 
1 0 627(a)(2)(C), 67 1 (a)(16), 675(1)(B), 675(5)(A),(B). The court in LaShawn also found 
that the CFSD's information system was woefully inadequate. 762 F. Supp. at 986. The 
court further noted that the CFSD failed "to investigate reports of abuse and neglect in 
a timely manner; . . . to provide services to children and families; . . . to make 
appropriate foster care placements; and . . . to assure a permanent home for the children 
in its care, among other things." Id. at 989. 
23 1. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 989. 
232. Id.; see also Wolfe ex rel. Joseph A. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 575 F. 
Supp. 346, 353 (D.N.M. 1983) ("It is clear that the plaintiffs may obtain injunctive and 
declaratory relief for violations of Title IV."). 
233. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 989. 
234. 816 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1987). 
235. 748 F. Supp. 1 128 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
236. Srrivner, 816 F.2d at 262; Winston, 748 F. Supp. at 1130. 
237. Scnvnm, 816 F.2d at 262; IVinston, 748 F. Supp. at 1131. The plaintiffs in lVins!on 
urged that the court establish four hours per week as the minimum visitation period. 
748 F. Supp. at 1130. 
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required the states to provide for meaningful visitation, the courts 
concluded that there was no such statutory right.238 
In fact, however, the Act can be construed to create an enforcea- 
ble right to meaningful visitation. First, Title IV-E provides federal 
reimbursement to states for foster care maintenance payments.239 
"Foster care maintenance payments" are defined, in part, as pay- 
ments to cover the cost of "reasonable travel to the child's home for 
~isitation."2~O Furthermore, parents are entitled to procedural safe- 
guards for "any determination affecting visitation privileges."241 
Thus, the Act explicitly contemplates visitation between the child 
and his or her parents. Certainly, Congress would not go through 
the trouble of explicitly acknowledging the right to visitation unless 
it contemplated that such visitation be meaningf~l .~~Z 
Complementing these explicit references to visitation is the im- 
plicit underlying theme of the Act, permanency planning for chil- 
dren who have entered the foster care system to enable them to be 
reunited with their families or released for adoption. When the 
placement goal is reunification, meaningful visitation is 
Moreover, one purpose of the Act is to shorten the average length 
of stay in foster care.244 Thus, one aspect of the reasonable efforts 
requirement discussed above, is the "reasonable effort . . . to make it 
possible for the child to return to his home."245 Such reasonable 
- - - - - - 
238. Sm'vner, 816 F.2d at 264; Winston, 748 F. Supp. at 1133. In B.H. v. Johnson, 715 
F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989). the court rejected a similar claim to meaningful sibling 
visitation, stressing that plaintiffs' entitlement to an individualized case plan and case 
review system did not mean plaintiffs have rights of meaningful visitation between 
siblings. Id. at 1402. 
239. 5 675(4)(A); see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
240. 5 675(4)(A). 
241. 5 675(5)(C). 
242. The term "meaningful," like the term "reasonable," may be incapable of precise 
definition, but that does not render it too vague to be enforceable for purposes of 
5 1983. Cf: Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2523 (1990) (stating that 
judiciary is competent to inquire into reasonableness). One of the rules of statutory 
construction is that a statute should be construed, if possible, to give meaning to each 
provision. If the reference to visitation is meaninglesi, Congress would have omitted it. 
243. As the court in LaShawn recognized, "For children in foster care, regular visits 
with their . . . parents and siblings are crucial if there is to be any chance of 
reunification." 762 F. SUDD. 959.985-86 (D.D.C. 1991). Even when reunification is not . . 
the goal, meaningful visitation may be required to help the child work through the 
problems that initially led to his or her removal from the home. See Leon A. Rosenberg, 
Psychological Factors in Separation and Reunification: The Nee& of the Child and of the Family, 
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J., Winter 1991, at 19, 20. 
244. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
245. 5 671(a)(15). Similarly, the Case Plan is a plan for assuring that sufficient 
services are provided to the parents, child and foster parents to "facilitate return of the 
child to his own home or the permanent placement of the child." 5 675(1)(B); see supra 
text accompanying note 88. 
Heinonline - -  60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 629 1991-1992 
CINCINNA TI LA W RE VIEW 
efforts, it seems, must include meaningful ~ i s i t a t i o n . 2 ~ ~  Although 
every case is unique,247 reasonable efforts may require more than 
allowing a child to visit his or her biological parents for one hour 
every two weeks.248 Reasonable efforts were certainly not made in 
cases like LaShawn, when "[sleventy percent of [the] children had no 
parent-child visiting schedules in their records."249 
Another basis on which a right of meaningful visitation could be 
found is the requirement that each child in the foster system receive 
'6 proper care."Z5O Proper care includes placement "in close proxim- 
ity to the parents' home, consistent with the best interests and spe- 
cial needs of the child."25l Certainly, at least one reason for 
requiring that an effort be made to place the child close to home is 
to maintain contact between the parents and the child.252 Thus, the 
Act both explicitly and implicitly suggests that meaningful visitation 
is an enforceable right. 
246. The court in Winston acknowledged that "[tlhe plaintiffs' best argument that 
visitation is . . . essential is the claim that it is fundamental to the 'reasonable efforts' . . . 
to reunify families. . . . The plaintiffs have presented evidence indicating that frequent 
visits between parent and child are helpful in leading to the eventual reunification of the 
family." 748 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
247. Many factors must be considered to determine what an appropriate visitation 
schedule should be in any given case, and whether the visits should be supervised or 
unsupervised. Rosenberg, supra note 243, at 21-22. 
248. Scrivner v. Andrews, 816 F.2d 261, 262 (6th Cir. 1987); Winston, 748 F. Supp. at 
1131. After the original visitation schedule in Sm'vner was contested, it was modified to 
allow visitation "for three hours on two days of each week." 816 F.2d at 262. In 
Winston, the father's visitation rights were increased to a minimum of two hours per week 
only after initial requests for increased visitation rights were refused and he obtained 
counsel. 748 F. Supp. at 1131. The fact that the original visitation schedules in Winston 
and Scrivner were identical leads one to wonder whether state agencies routinely adopt 
identical, across-the-board visitation rights for all children. Many factors exist, 
including, most importantly perhaps, the physical and emotional well-being of the child 
that require visitation schedules to be individually tailored. Rosenberg, supra note 243, 
at 21-22. For example, studies suggest that even children who have been physically 
abused or neglected tend to blame themselves, and when there is insufficient contact 
with the abusive parent, many children tend to remember the good things about the 
parent and blame themselves for driving the parent away. Id. at 20. Thus, visitation may 
be necessary to remind the child that the parent is "a real person, not just . . . a hazy 
memory . . . of a perfect [parent]." Id. 
249. 762 F.Supp. 959, 973 (D.D.C. 1991). In LaShawn, the court did not directly 
address the issue of whether meaningful visitation is an enforceable right under the Act. 
250. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
251. 42 U.S.C.A. J 675(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991). 
252. H.R. REP. NO. 136, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1979) ("A child's chances of 
being reunited with his family are usually reduced when he is placed at great distances 
from his family and home community. Studies have shown that parent-child contact is 
often the only significant indicator of the potential for a child's being returned home 
once in care."). Other reasons for preferring placement in close proximity to the 
parents presumably include minimizing the disruption of the child's life so that he or she 
can continue to attend the same school, see friends and perhaps other extended family. 
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The court in Winston, however, refused to find an enforceable 
right based on the reasonable efforts requirement, explaining that it 
would not "create additional requirements not mentioned in the 
statute but merely 'consistent with [its] purpose."'253 The court 
further reasoned that to dictate a specific minimum number of visi- 
tation hours that must be allowed each week would unduly interfere 
with the state's flexibility to satisfy the Act's requirements in a vari- 
ety of 
Neither of these concerns is persuasive. First, the Supreme Court 
rejected the notion that section 1983 rights can only be found in the 
explicit language of a federal statute in Golden State Transit Corp. v. 
City of Los The Court explained that a section 1983 claim 
"turns on whether the statute, by its terms or as interpreted, creates 
obligations" specific enough to enforce.256 Second, finding a right 
to meaningful visitation would not unduly interfere with states' flex- 
ibility. States would retain the flexibility to determine where and 
when during each week the visits would take place, whether the vis- 
its should be supervised or unsupervised, and other details. 
Although requiring, for example, that visitation rights be individu- 
ally tailored to the circumstances of each case may somewhat restrict 
the states' flexibility and prevent them from standardizing visitation 
rights, it would be no more of an intrusion than other court orders 
that have been issued.25' In addition, any restriction of the states' 
flexibility would be outweighed by the potential benefits to the chil- 
dren and their families. It is unfortunate that the courts in Scm'vner 
and Winston were unwilling to break new ground and find an en- 
253. 748 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D. 111. 1989)). 
254. Id. at 1133. 
255. 110 S. Ct. 444, 452 (1989). 
256. Id. at 449 (emphasis added). The Court further elaborated on this principle 
noting: 
The city's . . . argument that the [National Labor Relations Act] does not 
secure rights against the State because the duties of the State are not 
expressly set forth in the text of the statute, is not persuasive. We have 
held, based on the language, structure, and history of the NLRA, that the 
Act protects certain rights. . . . While [those rights are] not set forth in the 
specific text of an enumerated section of the NLRA, that might well also 
be said with respect to any number of rights or obligations that we have 
found implicit in a statute's language. 
Id. at 451. 
257. The state could, for example, do research sufficient to indicate the number of 
visitation hours per week that would normally meet the statutory requirement and then 
create a rebuttable presumption that anything less than that number is inadequate. The 
research would have to determine whether a rebuttable presumption would he workable 
because there are individual factors to consider. See strpro note 248. 
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forceable right to meaningful visitation under the Child Welfare 
Another provision that has been unsuccessfully asserted as creat- 
ing an enforceable right is the provision requiring that states place 
children "in the least restrictive (most family like) setting avail- 
able."25Q One federal district court in two cases found that this stan- 
dard was too amorphous to enforce in a section 1983 claim.260 The 
court in B.H. v. Johnson explained, "It is difficult to know what is 
meant by . . . 'least restrictive setting.' "261 While the language, 
"least restrictive," leaves room for interpretation, this provision 
seems no more vague and amorphous than the reasonable efforts 
requirement. The very least restrictive setting would be a single 
family home in most cases. A group home would generally be more 
restrictive because there would be more children to supervise. The 
Act itself sets forth guidelines on what types of placements may be 
considered least restri~tive.~~Z Aside from placement in a foster 
258. Perhaps the problem in Sm'vner was with the allegations. Rather than allege a 
direct violation of the reasonable efforts provision, or the inadequacy of the Case Plan, 
the plaintiff simply alleged that she was deprived of the right to meaningful visitation. 
816 F.2d 261,262 (6th Cir. 1987). In Winston, however, these arguments were made and 
the court still failed to find an enforceable right. 748 F. Supp. at 1133. 
Although Sm'vner suggests an unwillingness on the part of the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit to privately enforce the Child Welfare Act, in Timmy S. v. Stumbo, 916 
F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1990), the court held that foster parents could not be excluded from 
the administrative hearing provided for in Q 671(a)(12), stressing that the right to a 
hearing applied to "any individual whose claim for benefits . . . is denied or is not acted 
upon with reasonable promptness." Id. at 315 (quoting Timmy S. v. Stumbo, No. 80-24, 
slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 7, 1989)). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 
also noted that the Act may confer enforceable rights on children and parents in 
general, Lesher v. Lavrich, 784 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1986), but held that no such 
enforceable right was asserted in an action for damages and retrospective relief 
attempting to set aside a state court decision finding the biological mother guilty of 
neglect. Id. at 197-98; see also In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 
1204 (D. Minn. 1987) ("[Wlhatever rights the [Child Welfare] Act might confer . . ., 
relief nullifying a prior state court judgment . . . or awarding damages in connection 
therewith, would not be available." (quoting Lesher, 784 F.2d at 197-98)). a$ 'd on other 
groundc sub nom. Myers v. Scott County, 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989); see infra note 331 
for a discussion of damages. 
259. 5 675(5)(A). 
260. See Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D. 111. 1989); B.H. v. 
Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
261. B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1401 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman. 
451 U.S. 1 (1981)). The holding in B.H. is particularly curious since the court found a 
3 1983 right to a Case Plan and a Case Review System under Q 671(a)(16). See id. at 
1402. Because the right to placement in "the least restrictive" setting is part of the Case 
Review System requirements, the court in B.H. appears to conclude that while there is a 
procedural right to a Case Review System, the substance of the Case Review System need 
not be complied with. See irfra notes 319-20 and accompanying text. 
262. 5 672. 
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family home,26s foster children may be placed in a child-care institu- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Such institutions are defined, among other things, as insti- 
tutions that accommodate no more than twenty-five children, and 
expressly excludes "detention facilities, forestry camps, training 
schools, or any other facility operated primarily for the detention of 
children who are determined to be delinquent."265 The legislative 
history also gives some guidance on the least restrictive setting 
requirement: 
A continuum of placements ranging from least restrictive to 
most restrictive would include at a minimum the following: 
foster family homes; group homes and community residences; 
residential treatment centers and child care in~titutions.2~~ 
Thus, the Act's definitions of foster family home and child care 
institution along with the legislative history provide the objective 
benchmark needed to find an enforceable right to placement in the 
least restrictive setting. It is, therefore, difficult to understand a 
statement like that recognized by the court in B.H. that "it is un- 
likely that a State would have accepted federal funds had it known 
that it would be bound to provide such treatment."267 Placement in 
263. A foster family home is defined as "a foster family home for children which is 
licensed by the State . . . or has been approved, by the agency of such State having 
responsibility for licensing homes. . . as meeting the standards established for such 
licensing." 5 672(c)(1). 
264. 5 672(a)(3). 
265. 5 672(c)(2). In addition, the institution must be licensed by the state or be 
approved by the state agency responsible for licensing, as meeting the standards for 
licensing. Id. 
266. H.R. REP. NO. 136, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 48 (1979). The legislative history also 
suggests that to achieve the least restrictive setting goal, Congress anticipated that states 
would create new placements such as group homes. Id. at 48. 
267. 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. 
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981)). The Court in Pennhurst noted that: 
legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature 
of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with 
federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to 
legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State 
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' There can 
. . . be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is 
unable to ascertain what is expected of it. 
451 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted). Because 42 U.S.C. 3 6010 was simply a statement of 
findings, see supra note 150-55 and accompanying text, the Court reasoned that a state 
would not understand that it had an obligation to place those protected by the statute in 
the least restrictive setting. Id. at 18. Section 6010 "is simply a general statement of 
'findings' and, as such, is too thin a reed to support the rights and obligations read into 
it by the court below." Id. at 19. Although the Court also said that it would be "difficult 
to know what is meant by 'providing appropriate7 treatment in the 'least restrictive' set- 
ting," the basis of its decision was that § 6010 lacked any language to suggest to states 
that they were obligated to comply with its terms. Id. at 24-25. 
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the least restrictive setting is an explicit prerequisite to the receipt 
of federal funds as any responsible state official should recognize. 
In conclusion, aside from the Case Plan and Case Review System 
requirements, the courts do not agree on the scope of enforceable 
rights under the Child Welfare Act. Artist M. v. Johnson268 and sev- 
eral other courts found that the reasonable efforts requirement also 
created an enforceable but the Supreme Court's grant of 
certiorari to hear the issue of the private enforcement of the reason- 
able efforts requirement leaves its status in doubt.270 Other courts 
have found that several provisions taken together create enforceable 
rights within the meaning of section 1983.27' Even the courts that 
have found enforceable rights under the Act have narrowly tailored 
the relief they 0rdered .~~2 
C. The Court Orders 
While most courts that have found enforceable rights under the 
Act have ordered the states to implement specific changes to ensure 
compliance with the Act, the scope of those orders has been limited. 
In Artist, the court concluded that assigning a caseworker to each 
child was the basic means of satisfying the reasonable efforts re- 
q~irement.27~ There were often substantial delays between the time 
a child entered the Illinois foster care system and the time that he or 
she was assigned a caseworker.274 In addition, if a caseworker re- 
signed or was otherwise removed from the case, there were often 
significant time lags before a new caseworker would be assigned.275 
Thus, the court ordered that caseworkers be assigned within three 
The requirements of the Child Welfare Plan, the Foster Care Plan, the Case Plan and 
the Case Review System are explicit conditions for federal funding, seesupra notes 43-45 
and accompanying text, and the right to be placed in the "least restrictive setting" is one 
of the requirements of the Case Review System. See supra note 72 and accompanying 
text. Because the right to be placed in the least restrictive setting is a condition of fed- 
eral funding, Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1990). and Wright 
v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1987). are 
closer to the facts at issue under the Child Welfare Act than Pennhurst. See supra notes 
144, 150-57 and accompanying text. 
268. 917 F.2d 980, 987 (7th Cir. 1990). cert. granted sub nom. Suter v .  Artist M., 11 1 S. 
Ct. 2008 (1991). 
269. See supra notes 210-21 and accompanying text. 
270. Suter v. Artist M., 1 1 1 S. Ct. 2008 (1991). 
271. See supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text. 
272. See injra notes 273-95 and accompanying text. 
273. 917 F.2d 980, 987 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Suter v. Artist M., 11 1 S. 
Ct. 2008 (1991). 
274. Id. at 991. 
275. Id. at 984. "[Tlhe total number of unassigned cases jumped from 232 on June 
30. 1989, to 404 by year's end and the number of cases unassigned for over 30 days 
doubled over the same period of time." Id. at 984 n.8. 
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days of the time that the child entered state supervision, and that if a 
caseworker was removed from the child's case, a new caseworker be 
reassigned within three d a ~ s . 2 ~ ~  
Similarly, the court in Lynch v. D ~ k a k i s ~ ~ ~  affirmed the district 
court order that the Massachusetts Department of Social Services 
assign each child to a caseworker within twenty-four hours of its re- 
ceipt of the ca~e,~78 noting that "when a case is not assigned to a 
social worker directly responsible for servicing the case, the case 
planning and periodic review mandated by Title IV-E will not be 
pr0vided."2~~ The injunction in Lynch went a step further than that 
in Artist, though, because it restricted the number of cases any one 
caseworker could be assigned to the number that he or she was 
"able to carry and simultaneously fulfill [his or her] obligations 
[under Title IV-E.]"280 The court upheld the district court's find- 
ing, as a rebuttable presumption, that caseworkers could carry out 
their responsibilities of creating case plans and conducting case re- 
views with a caseload of twenty "generic" cases.28' Also, in Norman 
v. Johns0n,28~ when children were removed from their homes be- 
cause of their parents' poverty and inability to locate adequate hous- 
ing, the court not only ordered that a caseworker be assigned to 
meet with the plaintiff families within a specified time, but also that 
the caseworkers prepare a written case plan that would identify the 
housing obstacles and the resources available to help overcome 
them.283 
While the defendants in Lynch and Artist argued that the court or- 
dered injunctive relief would unduly interfere with their operations 
and was inconsistent with principles of federalism,2s4 the court or- 
276. Id. at 984. 
277. 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983). 
278. Id. at 508, 514. 
279. Id. at 514. The court recognized enforceable rights not only in the children but 
in "all members of the children's natural and foster families." Id. at 506. 
280. Id. at 508. 
281. Id. at 512. 
282. 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
283. Id. at 1192. This is consistent with the analysis suggested by Shotton, supra note 
201. 
284. See Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980, 990 (7th Cir. 1990). cert. granted sub nom. 
Suter v. Artist M., 11 1 S. Ct. 2008 (1991); Lynch, 719 F.2d at 513. In Rosado v. Wyman, 
397 U.S. 397 (1970), the Court said: 
While we view with concern the escalating involvement of federal courts 
in this highly complicated area of welfare [AFDC] benefits . . . we find not 
the slightest indication that Congress meant to deprive federal courts of 
their traditional jurisdiction to hear and decide federal questions in this 
field. . . . It is . . . peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less in the 
welfare field than in other areas of the law, to resolve disputes as to 
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ders were narrowly limited to the prompt assignment of 
ca~eworkers.2~5 The courts did not dictate the manner in which the 
caseworkers should carry out their duties.286 Nor did they mandate 
that specific services be provided.za7 They simply ordered that 
caseworkers be assigned in a timely manner.288 
In Daw ex rel. L.J. M a s ~ i n g a , ~ ~ ~  on the other hand, when the court 
found that the foster care system as a whole was mismanaged, it up- 
held the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction which or- 
dered defendants 
to submit a plan for the review of foster homes about which a 
report of maltreatment has been made, to monitor child place- 
ments in foster homes at least monthly and in some instances 
weekly, to expand its medical services to foster children in- 
cluding the keeping of medical records, and to provide 
prompt written reports of maltreatment of foster children to 
their attorneys and the juvenile court, including the action 
taken thereon.290 
The order in Massinga is broader than the orders in Artist or Lynch 
that required caseworkers assigned to each child within a specified 
time.291 One of the most progressive things about Massinga is that 
the court specifically ordered the state to expand its medical serv- 
ices.292 Most courts have been unwilling to dictate that states adopt 
specific services. While the court in LaShawn A. v. Dkon 293 deferred 
whether federal funds allocated to the States are being expended in 
consonance with the conditions that Congress has attached td  their use. 
Id. at 422-23. 
285. 917 F.2d at 990; 719 F.2d at 514. 
286. Artist, 917 F.2d at 990; Lynch, 719 F.2d at 514. As the court in Artist explained, 
the "injunctive relief does not dictate a method of assigning caseworkers o r  interfere 
with the ability of caseworkers to exercise their own professional judgment on the job." 
917 F.2d at 990. 
287. Id.; Lynch, 719 F.2d at 514. 
288. Artist, 917 F.2d at 990; Lynch, 719 F.2d at 514. The court in Artist amended its 
order to include a reporting mechanism so that it could monitor compliance with the 
order. 917 F.2d at 984. While there may be several methods by which the states could 
have satisfied the Act's requirements, they should not be heard to complain that the 
court is restricting their flexibility when they have failed to adhere to those requirements 
and denied children and their families the rights to which they were entitled. 
289. 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989). 
290. Id. at 120. 
291. The plaintiffs in Artist, while alleging violations of various provisions of the Act, 
said that those provisions were violated specifically because of the failure to timely 
assign caseworkers. 917 F.2d at 983. Thus, it is not surprising that the court's order was 
essentially limited to ordering that caseworkers be assigned within a specific time frame. 
The court also ordered the state to report weekly to show its compliance with the order. 
Id. at 984. 
292. Alnssinga, 838 F.2d at 120. 
293. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991). 
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issuing injunctive relief pending further briefing and arguments by 
the parties,294 the court seemed to recognize that the Act created an 
overall right to preventive services, proper foster care, and perma- 
nency planning. It is this acknowledgement that the Act creates 
comprehensive rights that will lead to an acknowledgement of the 
need for system-wide relief. This will, in turn, make the Act most 
effective as a tool for foster care reform. 
What may, in the end, be even more effective than broad based 
injunctive relief is the impetus that court decisions like Massinga and 
Lashawn give the parties to settle. In both cases, the courts' decisions 
created the impetus for the defendants to reassess their positions 
and to settle with the plaintiffs.295 Without the Child Welfare Act 
and section 1983, the progress that has been made in foster care 
reform would almost certainly not have occurred. Thus, the exist- 
ence of the Child Welfare Act, along with section 1983, has far- 
reaching potential. 
The Child Welfare Act is a comprehensive effort on the part of 
Congress to achieve foster care reform. Unfortunately, its enact- 
ment has not, in itself, brought about all the necessary changes.296 
Private enforcement of the Act is necessary for several reasons. 
First, without private enforcement of the Act's provisions, the only 
remedy provided for by the Act is the reduction or termination of 
- - - -- - - - -- - - - 
294. Id. at 961. 
295. See id. at 989; Darr ex re1 LJ. v. Massinga, 699 F. Supp. 508, 518 (D. Md. 1988); see 
also Tracy Thompson, Foster Care Compromise is Reached, WASHINGTON POST, July 1 1, 199 1, 
at C1 (discussing settlement reached between American Civil Liberties Union and city). 
Under the agreement, the number of caseworkers will reportedly double over the next 
three years in order to limit each caseworkers caseload to "no more than 20 children for 
each worker dealing with children in foster homes . . . and no more than 15 children for 
.J 
each worker assigned to recruit adoptive parents," id., and an "outside monitor" will 
control key decisions by the Department of Human Services. Id.; cf. Shull ex rel. G.L. v. 
Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030, 1031-43 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (setting forth terms of consent 
decree between children and Missouri Division of Family Services). Among other 
things, the consent decree included, detailed requirements for the licensing of foster 
care homes, id. at 1031-32, training of foster care parents, id. at 1033, and supervision of 
the foster home, id. at 1034-35. The consent decree also included provisions for the 
training of social workers, id. at 1036-37, and for limiting the caseloads of the social 
workers. id. at 1036. Furthermore. it included ~rovisions designed to ensure that each 
" 
child in foster care receive adequate medical and dental care, such as requiring that each 
child be enrolled in a health maintenance organization or a pre-p%d health plan. Id. at 
1037-38. The consent decree also included specifics regarding permanency planning, 
visitation, and other essential services. Id. at 1038-40. 
296. See sripra notes 8-27 and accompanying text. 
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funds, a remedy that will leave children in a worse position than 
before, because there will be less money for the states to operate 
their foster care systems.297 Second, it has been suggested that fed- 
eral oversight of state foster care systems is lax.298 Therefore, chil- 
dren are likely to suffer further harm while awaiting action by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to remedy a 
state's failure to comply. Thus, HHS's oversight authority needs to 
be supplemented with private enforcement. One case illustration of 
the problems associated with the lack of adequate enforcement of 
the Act and the resulting lack of appropriate services is LaShawn A. 
v. D i ~ o n . ~ ~ ~  The court in LaShawn found a substantial failure on the 
part of the District of Columbia government to comply with the 
Child Welfare Act,S00 including the failure to provide preventive 
services,SO' the consistent failure to provide services once children 
were placed in foster ~are,~O2 inappropriate placements,303 lack of 
297. Compatible state statutes have been enacted which should help enforce the 
requirements of the Act. EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION, KEEPING FAMILIES 
TOGETHER: THE CASE FOR FAMILY PRESERVATION 16 (1985) [hereinafter KEEPING 
FAMILIES TOGETHER]. 
298. See No PLACE TO CALL HOME. subra note 8. at 11. 
Weak federal monitoring and oversight have undermined 
implementation of protections and services under [the Act]. The 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) fails to monitor the 
requirement to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent the need for 
placement and to make it possible for a child to return home, and fails to 
I assess whether states' Title IV-B child welfare services programs are 
< 
adequate to meet the needs of the children and families served. 
Id. 
299. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991). 
300. Id. at 989. The expert testimony found that "the District's foster care system was 
operating in much the same way as otherjurisdictions had operated prior to the passage 
of the [Child Welfare Act]: as a holding system for children." Id. at 966. 
301. Id. at 970. The court found that there were no drug treatment services, no 
housing or employment assistance, or other services to help prevent the need for foster 
care placement. Id. Thus, the court found that the reasonable efforts requirement to 
prevent the need for foster care was not satisfied. Id. The named plaintiff, LaShawn A., 
for example, was placed in voluntary care by her mother who was homeless and 
suffering from emotional problems. Id. at 983. No preventive services were offered that 
might enable LaShawn A. to remain at home, and she had no contact with her biological 
family for at least two years after she entered the foster care system. Id. 
302. Id. at 986. 
303. Id. at 971-72. A psychiatric evaluation suggested that one girl was placed in a 
home where there was an "overuse of physical punishment and perhaps even sexual 
abuse." Id. at 983. In another case, an 11 year old boy who spent virtually his entire life 
in foster care, had been in I1 different placements, "including foster homes, group 
homes, residential treatment facilities, and hospitals." Id. at 985. This boy told the 
hospital staff that "he hated himself and he climbed into a trash can and asked to be 
thrown away." Id. In addition, although the boy's primary placement goal was 
adoption, his case had never been referred to the adoption branch of the District of 
Columbia Child and Family Services Division. Id. 
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case plans and timely case review~,~O~ and improper goals when they 
existed.305 As a result of this ineptly managed system, the average 
stay for children in the District of Columbia foster care system was 
4.8 year~.~06 
To date, there have been encouraging opinions by some courts, 
such as LaShawn, that have recognized that the Child Welfare Act 
created enforceable rights. Nevertheless, the opinions do not go far 
enough for two reasons. First, most courts recognize only very lim- 
ited section 1983 rights under the Act.307 Second, even for those 
rights that are recognized, injunctive relief has been narrowly tai- 
lored and damage claims have often been denied.3O8 
The only provision of the Act that uncontroversially creates sec- 
tion 1983 rights is section 67 1 (a)(16), which requires the creation of 
a Case Plan and a Case Review System. The reasonable efforts re- 
quirement, the only other provision that has been the subject of rel- 
atively frequent litigation, has been found to be too vague and 
amorphous by some courts to create an enforceable right. More- 
over, although other courts have found that the reasonable efforts 
requirement creates an enforceable right for purposes of section 
1983, the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Artist v. Johnson ren- 
ders the enforceability of the reasonable efforts requirement 
uncertain.309 
304. Id. at 972-74. According to the expert testimony, 62 percent of foster children in 
the District of Columbia did not have written case plans. Id. at 966. 
305. Id. at 973. In one instance, a two-and-a-half month old boy was placed in foster 
care when his mpther was admitted to a psychiatric facility. Id. at 983-84. Although the 
caseworkers almost immediately determined that the boy should be a candidate for 
adoption, his stated placement goal was to return home. Id. at 984. In fact, the boy was 
returned home periodically over a 5 year period only to be repeatedly sent back to foster 
care because ofthe mother's psychiatric condition. Id. In another case, the goal in 1987 
, 
of a foster child was adoption. Id. Despite the biological mother's signing of an , -. .!' 
, . 
agreement to relinquish her parental rights, the agreement was never processed because , . : .  
it was lost and a year later the child's placement goal was "inexplicably listed [as] family 
reunification, a goal that, not surprisingly, never came to pass." Id. 
306. Id. at 968. 
307. See supra notes 158-268 and accompanying text. 
308. See supra notes 273-95 and accompany text. 
309. 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1990). cert. granted sub nom. Suter v. Artist M., 11 1 S. Ct .  
2008 (1991). In addition, the Supreme Court will determine whether children living at 
home who are not in foster care have enforceable rights under Title IV-E. The 
defendants claim that since there is no Title IV-E funding for children who are not in 
foster care they have no right to enforce the reasonable efforts requirement. For a 
discussion of the Title IV-E funding scheme, see supra note 57. Allen, supra note 18, at 
590, specifically rejected the argument on which the defendant in Artist relied: 
An argument can be made that a right to preventive and reunification 
services is reserved only for children in federally reimbursed care who are 
covered under the IV-E program. Such an argument arises from the fact 
that IV-B specifically requires that states develop preventive and 
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Other asserted rights, such as the right to meaningful visitation 
and placement in the least restrictive setting, have been denied. 
The decisions in Artist, Daw ex rel. L.J. v. Ma~singa,~lO and LaShawn 
are encouraging in their recognition that the Act requires states to 
comply with its overall statutory framework, and in finding that sev- 
eral provisions together give rise to section 1983 claims.sl1 Most 
courts, however, have found enforceable section 1983 rights based 
on isolated statutory provisions. Courts must view the Act more 
comprehensively to determine whether enforceable rights have 
been created. Congress, in enacting the Child Welfare Act, in- 
tended for states to provide sufficient services to children and their 
families, from the time the states become aware of the risk of family 
separation until the child is permanently placed in a stable environ- 
ment. In order to accomplish Congress' intent, services are needed 
in three different areas: first, preventive services to attempt to keep 
families together; second, services to properly care for children in 
foster care; and third, permanency planning services. 
There are three requirements of the Act, in addition to the Case 
Plan and Case Review System requirements, that if found to create 
enforceable rights for purposes of section 1983, would go a long 
way toward ensuring that the necessary services are provided. The 
three requirements are: 1) states use "reasonable efforts . . . prior to 
the placement of a child . . . to prevent or eliminate the need for" 
the child's removal from his or her home,3l2 2) states provide 
proper care to children who have entered the foster care system,313 
and 3) states use "reasonable efforts . . . to make it possible for the 
child to return to his home."314 These three provisions together 
encompass the goals of the Act and can be construed to afford a 
variety of rights to children and their families. As noted above, for 
example, the reasonable efforts requirement to return the child 
reunification service programs, but does not say directly that reasonable 
efforts must be made to provide these services in each child's case. . . . 
[Tlhe provisions in IV-B and IV-E were not intended to result in two 
separate systems of care, one for federally financed and one for solely 
state financed children. . . . Congress carefully tied the two programs 
together and in doing so intended comprehensive reform of state child 
welfare systems, not jusi changes that would benefit children under 
federal care. 
Id. 
310. 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988), cerf. denied, 488 U.S.  1018 (1989). 
3 1 1. See supra notes 2 10-32 and accompanying text. 
3 12. 5 67 1 (a)(15); see supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. 
313. 3 675(1)(B). 
314. 8 671(a)(15). In addition, there is a right to a "fair hearing to any individual 
whose claim for benefits . . . is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness." 
5 671(a)(12). 
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home should include the right to meaningful visitation.315 Also, 
proper care includes the right to be placed in the least restrictive 
setting.316 These three provisions are broad enough to allow courts 
to effectively enforce the Act as a whole and, where necessary, to 
invalidate system-wide failures in foster care. 
Even the recognition of these three requirements as rights for 
purposes of section 1983, however, will be of limited use unless the 
courts are also willing to order broad-based relief for deprivations 
of those rights.317 The key to ensuring compliance with the Act and 
to achieving its goals is the provision of services. Courts must, 
therefore, be willing to order the provision of specific services, 
where appropriate, to enable children and their families to secure 
their rights.S18 One impediment to granting broad-based relief is 
the failure to recognize that the rights created by the Act are both 
substantive and procedural in nature. In B.H. v. J0hnson,3~9 for ex- 
ample, despite finding an enforceable right to a Case Plan and Case 
Review System, the court refused to give substance to the right, and, 
therefore, refused to order the Illinois DCFS to provide specific 
services: 
[Pllaintiff's entitlement to a case review system and an individ- 
ualized case plan does not give rise to . . . rights . . . such as the 
right to an adequate number of case workers, family reunifica- 
tion services, services to 'troubled families,' or rights of mean- 
ingful visitation between siblings. The case review system and 
individualized case plans are procedures intended only to 
monitor the progress and well-being of children in state and 
foster care.320 
315. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text. 
316. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
317. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of 
Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 665 (1987) ("The principle that legal 
rights must have remedies is fundamental to democratic government. In a democracy, 
legal rights define social relations and promote human well-being in the broadest sense. 
Justice requires their enforcement. The principle is so obviously correct that assent to it 
is instinctive.") (footnote omitted). 
318. One program noted for its success, Homebuilders, focuses specifically on the 
provision of preventive services. KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER, supra note 297, at 13. 
Each caseworker is typically assigned to only two families and works intensively with 
each family over a five to six week period. Id. 
3 19. 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
320. Id. at 1402. By viewing the scope of the right so narrowly, what the court gave in 
one breath, it effectively took away in the next. The court's limited view of plaintiffs' 
rights is particularly disturbing in light of some of the facts pleaded. One child who was 
in foster care, for example, allegedly was placed in a setting so inappropriate that he 
faked a suicide attempt in order to be moved. Id. at 1390. Another child had been in the 
foster care system for less than six months and had already had five placements. Id. 
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In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital A~s'n,~2l the Supreme Court was con- 
fronted with a similar substance-procedure arg~ment .~22 The State 
of Virginia argued that its only obligation was to adhere to the pro- 
cedural funding prerequisite of finding that its medicaid reimburse- 
ment rates were reasonable and adequate, and making assurances to 
that effect to the Secretary.323 It denied any obligation to assure 
that the rates were in fact reasonable and adequate as a substantive 
matter.324 In rejecting the argument that the state's only duty was 
to go through the motion of making assurances rather than to sub- 
stantively make sure that the rates were reasonable and adequate in 
fact, the Court explained that the state's argument "would render 
the statutory requirements of findings and assurances, and thus the 
entire reimbursement provision, essentially meaningless. . . . We de- 
cline to adopt an interpretation . . . that would render [the Act] a 
dead letter."925 
The Child Welfare Act is explicit in requiring substantive as well 
as procedural reform. The Act specifically allows for the termina- 
tion or  reduction of federal financial assistance not only if the state's 
Foster Care Plan is not approved, but also if "a State plan which has 
been approved . . . no longer complies with the provisions of sub- 
section (a) . . . or that in the administration of the plan there is a 
substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the plan."326 
Other courts that have recognized both the substantive and pro- 
cedural requirements of the Act, nevertheless, have narrowly tai- 
lored injunctive relief. Requiring the prompt assignment of 
caseworkers, as the courts in Lynch v. D ~ k a k i s ~ ~ 7  and Artist did, is a 
good start and a necessary first step, but does not, in itself, ensure 
compliance with the The courts in these cases, for example, 
Virtually none of the children had regular contact with their caseworkers. Id. at 1390- 
9 1. 
321. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990). For a factual description of this case, see supra notes 
178-9 1 and accompanying text. 
322. 110 S. Ct. at 2517. 
323. Id. at 2519. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 2519-20. 
326. 3 671(b). Because the Foster Care Plan must provide for the creation of the 
Case Plan and Case Review System, 3 671(a)(16), all three must be complied with both 
in form and in substance. 
327. 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983). 
328. It may be that in Lynch and Arlzit, caseworkers were the key to compliance, but 
often state failures are widespread and cannot be remedied with a single fix. See, e . g ,  
Darr ex rel. LJ. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that officials 
could not claim immunity from liability when they could reasonably be expected to know 
that inaction would result in constitutional violations), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989); 
LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959,998 (D.D.C. 1991) (ordering status conference 
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could have gone a step further and ordered the caseworkers to un- 
dertake specific duties to rectify some of the state's failures. In Mas- 
s i n g ~ ,  when there were systemic deficiencies in the foster care 
system,329 the court went further than the courts in Artist and Lynch, 
and ordered broad based injunctive relief, which required the state, 
inter alia, to monitor child placements at least monthly, and in some 
cases weekly, and to expand its medical services to foster chil- 
dren.3S0 The court in LaShawn deferred the issuance of an injunc- 
tion because the parties entered into a tentative settlement. The 
tenor of the court's opinion suggests, however, that had the parties 
not settled, broad based relief would have been granted. Because 
the courts often find system-wide failures, they should be willing to 
order system-wide relief.331 There is "no justification in principle 
to discuss appropriate relief and parties to p;epare joint proposed schedule for 
establishing appropriate relief). 
329. 838 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989); see supra 
notes 222-25 and accompanying text. 
330. See supra notes 289-92 and accompanying text. 
331. Damages, as well as broader injunctive relief, should generally be available. As a 
general rule, both damages and injunctive relief are available to remedy violations of 
legal rights. See Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983). 
Because serious questions would arise under the Eleventh Amendment if federal courts 
required states tdpay money damages, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 
U.S. 1, 29-30, (1981), damage actions against state officials sued in their official capacity 
are prohibited. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 20 (1890). The Eleventh 
Amendment, however, does not protect state officials from personal damage liability. 
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 633 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
675-78 (1974). T o  protect state officials "from undue interference with their 
[discretionary] duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability," state officials 
are given a qualified immunity from damage suits. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
806 (1982). T o  overcome a claim of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the 
official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional o r  statutory right of the 
plaintiff that a reasonable person would have known was being violated. Id. at 818. See 
alro Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987): 
A clearly established right is one whereby: a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say 
that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very 
action in question has p~eviously beenheld unlawful, but it is to say that 
in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 
Id. (citation omitted). The  Child Welfare Act does create clearly established rights. At 
the very least, the rights to a Case Plan and Case Review System are clearly established. 
Not only are they explicitly required by the Act, but they are specifically defined, making 
compliance or noncompliance apparent. Therefore, in cases like LaShawn, where the 
court found that 62% of the children in foster care did not have written case plans, 762 
F. Supp. at 966, the officials in charge must have understood that their conduct violated 
the children's rights. See Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148, 1153-54 (5th Cir.) ("Any 
reasonable person would know . . . when to develop a plan, when to review the plan . . . 
[and] what elements to include in the case plans."), rehggranted, 862 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 
1988), appeal dismissed, 867 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989). In addition, the reasonable efforts 
requirement creates a clearly established right, although, in a given case the official may 
or may not "understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. Certainly, there 
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for drawing a distinction between invalidating a single nonconform- 
ing provision or an entire program. In both circumstances federal 
funds are being allocated and paid in a manner contrary to that in- 
tended by Congress."33* 
It is somewhat ironic that states have been so resistant to comply- 
ing with the Act because foster care is essentially an area where do- 
ing less costs more. As the court in Norman v. Johnson333 noted, 
"viewed purely in fiscal terms, it is often cheaper to provide initial 
payments for rent, security deposits, utilities, and other items than 
to instead incur the much greater expense of placement outside the 
family."3s4 In LaShawn, the court found that the District of Colum- 
bia was "losing millions of dollars in available federal funds because 
are some cases in which the unlawfulness of the conduct would be apparent. If, for 
example, no preventive sewices are provided to a family in need of financial assistance 
and the parents are told that their only option is to place their child in foster care, the 
unlawfulness of the officials' conduct should be apparent. Once the asserted rights go 
beyond the language of the statute, it may be more difficult to argue that the rights are 
clearly established for purposes of a damage claim. 
To date, damage claims-have received mixed responses from the courts. Some have 
indicated that damages may be awarded if the foregoing standards are met. See e.g., 
Massinga, 838 F.2d at 123 (holding that Supreme Court "did not distinguish between 
prospective equitable relief and an action for money damages in regard to the right to 
enforce privately"); Wolfe ex ref. Joseph A. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Sews., 575 F. 
Supp. 346, 353 (D.N.M. 1983) (stating that if plaintiffs have been denied rights granted 
by Social Security Act then damages may be awarded). Others have found no clearly 
established right. See Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 938 F.2d 1150, 1155 
(10th Cir. 1991). Other courts, however, have denied damages under the Child Welfare 
Act regardless of the right being asserted. See e.g., Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human 
Sews., 820 F.2d 923,928 (8th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that Act as funding statute may not 
create any enforceable rights). The reason for this most restrictive view of damage 
claims is that damages are not available in an action to enforce legislation enacted pur- 
suant to the Spending Clause. See Scrivner v. Andrews, 816 F.2d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 
1987). In Guardians, Justice White, writing the plurality opinion for the Court, which was 
joined only by Justice Rhenquist, stated that monetary relief is not ordinarily available in 
private actions seeking relief under a statute passed by Congress pursuant to the Spend- 
ing Clause. 463 U.S. at 596. "This is because the receipt of federal funds under typical 
Spending Cause legislation is a consensual matter." Id. Thus, the state can simply 
choose not to in the program rather than comply with the legislation. Injunc- 
tive relief is, therefore, appropriate because "the recipient has the option of withdrawing 
and hence terminating the prospective force of the injunction." Id. Justice White's anal- 
ysis was sharply criticized by the dissent as being incorrect and dicta. See id. at 636-38 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
332. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 421 (1970) (concluding that New York's Social 
Services law was incompatible with AFDC program of Social Security Act). 
333. 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
334. Id. at 1186; see also In re S.A.D., 555 A.2d 123, 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
(emphasizing "high financial . . . cost of maintaining a child in out-of-home care 
coipared to the minimal cost of paying the family's initial rent, security deposit or 
utility bill." (quoting MAKING REASONABLE EFFORTS, supra note 201, at 59); It) re M.H., 
444 N.W.2d 110, 112 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) ("Foster care is expensive and costs 
considcrably more per month than the best in-home programs."). 
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of its serious management and systemic deficiencies."s35 Thus, the 
court was less than sympathetic to the district's arguments that it 
was under severe budgetary restraints. "The Court finds it disin- 
genuous for the District to blame its inadequacies on a lack of fund- 
ing when it has failed to obtain the generous funding that is readily 
available to it."336 
CONCLUSION 
Through the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 
Congress enacted comprehensive requirements for foster care re- 
form. The Act created a framework for state foster care systems 
with which states must comply in order to receive federal financial 
assistance. When states fail to comply, private enforcement of the 
Act'is both appropriate and necessary to protect children and their 
families. To date, courts have found limited rights under the Act for 
purposes of section 1983. They need, however, to go further. 
Courts need to recognize broad-based rights under the Act and dis- 
play a greater willingness to order broad-based relief when those 
rights are violated. 
335. 762 F. Supp. at 980, 981 ("The District is currently losing approximately $14 
million a year in potential funding under the [Child Welfare] Act."). As the court 
explained: 
Federal reimbursements under the Adoption Assistance Act are 'open 
ended.' That is, there is no cap on the amount of money a state agency 
may receive for certain eligible activities o r  services provided to eligible 
children. States and the District of Columbia are reimbursed according 
to an established 'Federal Financial Participation' rate, which is 50 
percent for most eligible activities and 75 percent for eligible training 
activities. T o  receive federal reimbursements under the Act, the claimant 
must establish not only the eligibility of the activity, but the eligibility of 
the child benefitting from that activity. Eligibility for reimbursements 
under the Act is tied to eligibility for [AFDC]. At least 75 percent of 
children in the District's foster care are AFDC eligible, yet the CFSD had 
established eligibility under the [Child Welfare] Act for only 24 percent 
in July 1987 and 22.6 percent in July 1988. This compares to eligibility 
rates of 72 percent in New York City [and] 56 percent in Philadelphia. 
Id. at 980. 
The court pointed out that some other states had received enormous increases in 
federal financial assistance after complying with the Act. Id. at 981. For example, Ohio 
received only $5.8 million under the Act in 1984, but after improving its compliance 
record, it received $52 million in 1990. Id. Pennsylvania's federal assistance went from 
$43 million to $97 million over the same time period. Id. 
336. Id. 
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This article was in its final editing phase when the United States 
Supreme Court decided Suter v. Artzit. 337 The Court held that the 
reasonable efforts provision of the Child Welfare Act did not create 
a privately enforceable section 1983 right.338 While this article's 
foregoing analysis of the reasonable efforts provision describes why 
the author disagrees with the Court's conclusion,339 a few specific 
observations about the Court's opinion are warranted. First, the 
Court, without explanation or  acknowledgement of any inconsis- 
tency with Wilder, stated that neither the Act or regulations "places 
any requirement for state receipt of federal funds other than the 
requirement that the State submit a plan to be approved by the Sec- 
r e t a r ~ . " ~ ~ O  In other words, as long as the states comply with the 
procedure of filing the necessary plans with the Secretary, they need 
not comply with the reasonable efforts requirement in substance.s4' 
In Wilder, the Court rejected a similar procedure over substance ar- 
gument.s42 Without directly confronting this inconsistency, the 
Court in Suter, suggested that the regulations under the Child Wel- 
fare Act did not provide sufficient guidance to the states, as did the 
regulations at issue in Wzlder.343 Nevertheless, the Court set forth in 
a footnote, without explanation, the regulation that specified the 
kinds of services that may satisfy the reasonable efforts require- 
ment.344 While providing the text of the regulation, the Court virtu- 
ally ignored it. 
Second, the Court's dicta about Congressional foreclosure is dis- 
turbing. It suggsted that the remedies provided for in the Child 
Welfare Act, might constitute a congressional foreclosure problem. 
The Court found it unnecessary to decide the foreclosure issue in 
the light of its holding that there was no enforceable right under 
section 67 1 (a)(l 5).545 The court, however, noted that the Secre- 
337. 60 U.S.L.W. 4251 (March 25, 1992). 
338. Id. at 2456. 
339. See supra notes 174-221 and accompanying text. 
340. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4255. 
341. Id. ("[Tlhe regulations are not specific, and d o  not provide notice to the States 
that failure to d o  anything other than submit a plan with the requisite features, to be 
approved by the secretary, is a further condition on the receipt of funds from the 
Federal Government."). 
342. 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2519-20 (1990). Seesupra notes 323-25 and accompanying text. 
The Court in Wilder held that the states could not simply provide assurances that its 
reimbursement rates were reasonable. Id. They had to be reasonable in fact. Id. 
343. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4255. The Court focused on the states' broad discretion to 
decide how to satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement. Id. 
344. Id. at 4255 n.14 (quoting 45 C.F.R. 8 1357(e)(2) (1990)). 
345. Id. at n. 1 1.  
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tary's ability to reduce or terminate funding to noncompliant states 
provided plaintiffs some remedy.346 Therefore, the "absence of a 
remedy to private plaintiffs under section 1983 does not make the 
reasonable efforts clause a dead letter."s47 The Court did not state 
that this "dead letter" standard is a new test for the availability of 
section 1983, and in fact, it gave lip service to the traditional test for 
congressional foreclosure.348 It is disturbing, though, that the 
Court seems satisfied that section 1983 is not necessary as long as its 
absence does not render the statute a dead letter. While the lack of 
a section 1983 claim may not make the reasonable efforts provision 
a dead letter, it may terminally weaken it. As the dissent concluded: 
[The Majority] has changed the rules of the game without 
offering even minimal justification, and it has failed even to 
acknowledge that it is doing anything more extraordinary than 
'interpret[ing]' the Adoption Act 'by its own terms.' Readers 
of the Court's opinion will not be misled by this hollow assur- 
ance. And, after all, we are dealing here with ~ h i d r e n . ~ ~ ~  
346. Id. at 4255. Of course, to the extent that state funds are reduced or terminated, 
the children who fall under the Child Welfare Act are likely to be in an even worse 
predicament. 
347. Id. 
348. Id. The Court acknowledged that congressional foreclosure is normally found 
only where the statute provided a comprehensive remedial scheme. Id. at 4255 n. l I. It 
also recognized that the Child Welfare Act "may . . . not provide a comprehensive 
enforcement mechanism so as to manifest Congress' intent to foreclose remedies under 
1983." Id. at 4255. 
349. Id. at 4259 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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